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In the past couple of decades, many in-vehicle features have been invented
and deployed in order to make modern vehicles which not only safer and more re-
liable but also connected, smarter, and intelligent. Meanwhile, vehicular ad-hoc
networks (VANETs) are proposed to provide communications between vehicles and
road-side stations as the foundation of the intelligent transportation system to pro-
vide efficient and safe transportation. To support these updated functions, a large
amount of electronic equipment has been integrated into the car system. Although
these add-on functions around vehicles offer great help in driving assistance, they
inevitably introduced new security vulnerabilities that threaten the safety of the on-
board drivers, passengers and pedestrians. This has been demonstrated by many
well-documented attacks either on the in-vehicle bus system or on the wireless vehic-
ular network communications. In this dissertation, we design and implement several
hardware-oriented solutions to the arousing security issues on vehicles. More specif-
ically, we focus on three important and representative problems: (1) how to secure
the in-vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN), (2) how to secure the communication
between vehicle and outside, and (3) how to establish trust on VANETs.
Current approaches based on cryptographic algorithms to secure CAN bus
violate the strict timing and limited resource constraints for CAN communications.
We thus emphasize on the alternate solution of intrusion detection system (IDS) in
this dissertation. We explore monitoring the changes of CAN message content or
the physical delay of its transmission to detect on the CAN bus. We first propose a
new entropy-based IDS following the observation that all the known CAN message
injection attacks need to alter the CAN identifier bit. Thus, analyzing the entropy
changes of such bits can be an effective way to detect those attacks. Next, we develop
a delay-based IDS to protect the CAN network by identifying the location of the
compromised Electronic Control Unit (ECU) from the transmission delay difference
to two terminals connected to the CAN bus. We demonstrate that both approaches
can protect the integrity of the messages on CAN bus leading to a further improve
the security and safety of autonomous vehicles.
In the second part of this dissertation, we consider Plug-and-Secure, an in-
dustrial practice on key management for automotive CAN networks. It has been
proven to be information theoretically secure. However, we discover side-channel
attacks based on the physical properties of the CAN bus that can leak almost the
entire secret key bits. We analyze the fundamental characteristics that lead to such
attacks and propose techniques to minimize information leakage at the hardware
level.
Next, we extend our study from in-vehicle secure CAN communication to the
communication between vehicle and outside world. We take the example of the
popular GPS spoofing attack and show how we can use the rich information from
CAN bus to build a cross-validation system to detect such attacks. Our approach
is based on the belief that the local driving data from the in-vehicle network can be
authenticated and thus trusted by secure CAN networks mechanisms. Such data can
be used to cross-validate the GPS signals from the satellite which are vulnerable to
spoofing attacks. We conduct driving tests on real roads to show that our proposed
approach can defend both GPS spoofing attacks and location-based attacks on the
VANETs.
Finally, we propose a Blockchain based Anonymous Reputation System (BARS)
to establish a privacy-preserving trust model for VANETs. The certificate and re-
vocation transparency is implemented efficiently with the proofs of presence and
absence based on the extended blockchain technology. To prevent the broadcast
of forged messages, a reputation evaluation algorithm is presented relying on both
direct historical interactions of that vehicle and indirect opinions from the other
vehicles.
This dissertation features solutions to vehicle security problems based on hard-
ware or physical characteristics, instead of cryptographic algorithms. We believe
that given the critical timing requirement on vehicular systems and their very lim-
ited resource (such as the bandwidth on CAN bus), this will be a very promising
direction to secure vehicles and vehicular network.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Overview of Automobile Security
Over the past few years, an increase in the number of connectivity interfaces
is added to the traditional automobile to improve safety and convenience. To assist
those fantasy computerized functions, sensors with electronic control unit (ECU)
are increasingly demanded in modern vehicles. For example, approximately 50-100
ECUs are deployed in a modern vehicle nowadays. Each ECU is assigned with some
specific functions and will be communicated to each other through the well-known
controller area network (CAN). CAN protocol is the de-facto standard for in-vehicle
networks and this adoption has been mandated in all cars manufactured since 2008.
Despite the high reliability and widespread implementation of the CAN protocol, it
is not surprising that vehicles can be hacked owing to vulnerabilities on the CAN
bus. Moreover, the potential for interference in such attacks is exacerbated by the
increasing external connections with the in-vehicle control network, including USB
ports, WiFi, Bluetooth, and the mandatory on-board diagnostic (OBD-II) port. As
a result, the lack of security fundamental protections of the CAN makes the in-
vehicle CAN bus networks vulnerable to attacks. In 2010, researchers provided the
first evidence showing that it is possible to control the vehicle by simply delivering
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compromising CAN messages [3]. By injecting these malicious CAN messages, they
could cause intentional malfunction of a wide of components including the engine,
instrument panel, radio, heating lights brakes and locks. Later on, several high
profile attacks have been demonstrated on modern car by academic and industrial
researchers, e.g. [4, 5, 6]. These attacks are primarily facilitated by the lack of
security (authentication, encryption) in the existing architecture of CAN.
On the other side, as the plenty of smart functions have been added on the ve-
hicles, vehicles increasingly evolve into an intelligent system. The intelligent vehicles
equipped with radio communications interfaces will exchange data with neighbor-
ing vehicles or the other entities through the vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs).
However, some unique features such as high mobility, short connection times and
short-range connection make conventional network security mechanisms are not al-
ways effective on VANETs. As a result, the vehicular network systems are much
more vulnerable to security threats and restricted on the network conditions. As
proved in paper [7], the recently aroused security attacks on the communication
channel and sensors would cause significant instability in the communication of ve-
hicle systems. Furthermore, those communication disabilities will influence the other
applications as well, i.e, cooperative driving and autonomous driving [8]. Therefore,
the security challenges need to be solved in order to make such networks safety
usable in practice. To solve the security problem in the next generative vehicular
networks, several frameworks to guarantee the security credential management for
vehicular communications are proposed [9]. On the other hand, when communicat-
ing through the VANETs, the drivers’ privacy needs to be protected as well. In
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particular, the other entities and casual observers should not be able to track down
the vehicle’s trajectory in the long term. It is also of great importance providing the
anonymous authentication with preserved privacy for the VANETs. Several works
have been published focusing on this problem [10, 11].
1.2 Inter-vehicular Network: CAN
ECUs installed in the vehicle need to communicate and exchange information
through the in-vehicle bus system follows CAN protocol [12]. CAN is the most
commonly used protocol in the vehicle industry and it has a fast reaction time and
proper transmission reliability [13]. It is a multi-master message broadcast system
with a maximum signal rate of 1Mbps. It allows the ECU to control the vehicle
maneuvers by sending and sharing messages through its bus system with the guar-
antee of timing predictability and fault-tolerance for communication. As a result,
CAN is commonly used for vehicles’ core control systems like body systems, engine
management, and transmission control. Compared to the traditional networks, such
as USB and Ethernet, CAN does not send large data blocks under the supervision
of a central master. In a CAN network, many short messages are broadcasted to the
entire network, which provides data consistency in every node of the system [14].
1.2.1 CAN Frame
The CAN message, also known as CAN frame, contains fields as identifier
(ID), data length code (DLC), data field, cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and other
3
control bits as shown in Fig 1.1 [15]. The messages sent out on the CAN bus are
distributed based on the identifier preceding the CAN frame. For the base frame
format, the identifier contains 11 bits and it has 29 bits for the extended frame
format. However, the ID in the CAN frame is neither the sender address nor the
receiver address. The first function of the identifier is to represent the priority
of the message. As we discussed before, CAN is a broadcast protocol and each
ECU could request the transmission without any central arbitration. To make sure
the transmissions are in sequence, the ID serves as the flag of the priority of that
message. Instead of the priority, the ID also represents the function of the message.
For example, the ID as 0x21 may represent the vehicle speed while the other ID
such as 0x13 may represent the tire pressure information. This function-mapping is
defined by the automobile manufacturer and is usually not disclosed to the public.
In practice, automotive designers assign a set of IDs for each ECU and one ID could
be assigned to several ECUs as well. The overlap in using message IDs makes CAN
messages are easily forged and difficult to be traced [16].
The data field contains a maximum of 8 bytes to be transmitted within the
message frame. Usually, the transmitted data is either the instructions of the ECUs
or the readings from the installed sensors on the vehicles. Usually 8 bytes could meet
the basic requirement of communication on the CAN bus and guarantee the real-
time simultaneously. However, recently aroused vulnerabilities from the CAN bus
may require security protections which implementing the cryptographic algorithms
with longer bit-length, i.e, the message authentication code usually needs 256-bit
payload. The payload of CAN frame seriously hinders the application of crypto-
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graphic algorithms [17] and protocols [18, 19] on the CAN. Those cryptographic
protocols based methods that send additional messages for message authentication,
will lead to a rapid increase in the bus load (to more than 50%). As a result, there
are arousing discussions and proposals to replace the CAN network by the Ethernet
[20] which mainly because the Ethernet packets have enough pay-load for complex
cryptographic protocols. The control field contains some control flags of the frame,
e.g, the length of the data field and the reserved bit. The fault tolerant of the CAN
data frame is realized by the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code which is appended
after the data field. The CRC field is designed to detect any error in the data packet
caused by transmission. And after CRC, two bits are assigned for acknowledgment.
The acknowledgment field confirms the receipt of a valid CAN packet.
Figure 1.1: CAN-frame in base format
1.2.2 Arbitration Mechanism of CAN Bus
CAN bus is a broadcast medium consisting of a series of nodes connected via a
twisted-pair cable with termination impedance at the end. It has two logical states,
the dominant 0 state, where the bus is driven by a voltage, and the recessive 1 state,
where the bus is grounded. CAN data transmission uses this bit-wise arbitration
method to decide which message should be sent on the CAN bus when multiple
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messages request the bus simultaneously. The arbitration rule is that the dominant
(logical 0) bits can always overwrite recessive bits (logical 1). More specifically,
CAN protocol implements the arbitration relied on the identifier field of the frame
with high-priority ID will win the bus arbitration while the node with low-priority
ID will be grounded because of losing the capability in transmission. The node with
lower priority who fails to transmit in the last time would automatically attempt to
re-transmit six bit clocks after the end of the last message. This makes CAN bus
system very suitable as a real-time prioritized communication system. Also, this
arbitration method requires all nodes on the CAN network to be synchronized on
the CAN network at the same time [21].
Since the CAN bus follows the bit-wise arbitration rule, the ID allocation is
very important because the arbitration is decided by the first 11-bit identifier. As
each frame starts with the 11-bit ID, the dominant bits overwrite the recessive pri-
ority bits of other frames transmitted at the same time. Only the highest priority
frame is received by all the connected nodes, while a lower priority device automat-
ically backs off when a recessive bit has been overwritten by somebody else. At
first, message IDs must be unique when transmitted on the CAN bus, otherwise,
two nodes would continue transmission beyond the end of the arbitration field (ID)
causing an error. Next, the manufactures should consider the message priority when
they allocate the IDs through the CAN bus. For example, they should assign those
critical real-time messages with high priority (the lower numerical ID). As a result,
bus usage can be achieved before any messages deadlines are missed [22]. A sender
ECU may include its unique ID number in the packet, and a receiver ECU retrieves
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the packet by identifying the ID of the sender. Thus CAN packet has no explicit
destination field.
The modern automobile may have up to 100 ECUs for diverse subsystems. An
ECU controls the specific maneuvers for his subsystem by sending out the messages
orderly and receiving the sensor data by decoding the messages through the CAN
bus. The messages sent out on CAN bus are distributed based on the ID preceding
the CAN frame. However, the ID is not the sender address nor the receiver address.
The ID represents the function of the message, and this function-mapping is defined
by the automobile manufacturer and is not disclosure to public. In practice, auto-
motive designers assign a set of IDs for each ECU and one ID could be assigned to
several ECUs as well. The overlaps in using message IDs would arouse a challenge
for the detection system, even the detection mechanism could find out the malicious
message based on the ID, he may fails in knowing who is actually sending this.
Thus, it is difficult to identify the malicious attacker just with the knowledge of the
message IDs.
1.2.3 CAN Bus Network Typology
CAN bus has different standardized speeds ranging from 5 to 1000 kBit/s.
Most common are 500 kBit/s and 100 kBit/s, while 500 kBit/s networks have higher
demands in terms of cables and CAN bus transceiver chips. Depending on the make
and model, there are several CAN buses in a modern car. The most prominent
reason for having more than one CAN bus is to guarantee the clear separation
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for safety in order to hold fault-tolerance in case one bus fails. The other benefit
is that using multiple buses could reduce cost as deploying the lower speed CAN
buses where high-speed CAN buses are not needed. Because of the difference in
the speed, there are two types of CAN bus layout, the high-speed CAN and the
low-speed CAN [5, 23]. Notice that for both high-speed and low-speed CAN, the
speed of the transition is faster when a recessive to dominant transition occurs since
the CAN wires are being actively driven.
ISO 11898-2 is the most used physical layer standard for high-speed CAN
networks. The data rate is defined up to 1M bit/s with a required bus length of
40 m at 1M bit/s. As shown in Figure 1.2, the high-speed CAN uses a linear bus
terminated at each end with 120Ω resistors. The high-speed standard specifies a
two-wire differential bus whereby the number of nodes is limited by the electrical
busload. The two wires are identified as CAN H and CAN L. The common mode
voltage ranges are from -2 V on CAN L to +7 V on CAN H. The node can be a
simple I/O device or an embedded controller with the CAN interface. The node may
also be a gateway allowing a standard computer to communicate over the USB or
Ethernet port to the devices on a CAN network. The linear topology CAN network
is usually used as a high-speed CAN bus for the critical automotive applications,
e.g, the engine and transmission.
The layout of low-speed CAN bus network is regulated in the ISO 11898-3
standard. It is also called fault tolerant CAN, uses a star bus and is terminated at
each node by a fraction of the overall termination resistance. Fault tolerant CAN
is often used where groups of nodes need to be connected together forming a sub-
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Figure 1.2: High-speed CAN Network ISO 11898-2
network. Since for this specification a short network was assumed, the problem
of signal reflection is not as important as for long bus lines. This makes the use
of an open bus line possible which indicates that low-speed drivers can be used for
networks with very low power consumption and the bus topology is no longer limited
to a linear structure. It is possible to transmit data asymmetrically over just one
bus line in case of an electrical failure of one of the bus lines. ISO 11898-3 defines
data rates up to 125 kbit/s with the maximum bus length and up to 32 nodes per
network are specified. The common mode voltage ranges are between -2 V and +7
V. The power supply is defined at 5 V. The low-speed CAN bus is usually used on
some non-critical applications, such as the entertainment system or display unit of
the vehicle.
In a real vehicle, both the two types of bus layout will be applied. Moreover,
the length of the bus network will be extended to 3-10 meters based on the scale
and design of the real vehicle. The physical layout of ECUs will not be altered after
manufacturing, even under cyber attacks where the attacker could easily achieve
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access on the bus but have no capability in changing the physical layout of the CAN
bus.
Figure 1.3: Low-speed CAN Network ISO 11898-3
1.2.4 CAN with Flexible Data Rate
CAN with Flexible Data Rate (CAN-FD) is an extension to the classic CAN
bus protocol. It is an improved CAN-based communication protocol, with higher
communication bandwidth (up to 8 Mbps for the payload) and increased payload
size (up to 64 Bytes) [24]. The CAN-FD protocol is designed with the goal to
increase the bandwidth while keeping unchanged most of the software and hardware
(especially the physical layer).
The CAN-FD protocol realizes the requirement for “real time” by minimizing
of delays between instruction and transfer of data (latency) with higher bandwidth.
CAN-FD also allocates more data capacity in the CAN-frame. As aforementioned,
the classic CAN has the capacity as 8 bytes in the data field, while CAN-FD can
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hold up to 64 bytes. This is accomplished through a decrease in relative overhead
and improvements to software simplicity and efficiency when transmitting large
data. CAN-FD also has decreased the number of undetected errors by improving
the performance of the CRC algorithm. In addition, CAN-FD is compatible with
the existing CAN networks, allowing the new protocol applied on the same network
as classic CAN. CAN-FD has been estimated to transmit data up to 30 times faster
than the classic CAN. Besides, CAN-FD protocol controllers can take part in normal
CAN communication. This allows a gradual introduction of CAN-FD nodes into
existing CAN systems.
1.3 Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) [1, 25] have gained lots of popu-
larity in both industry and academia. In addition, to provide entertainment ser-
vices, the main motivation of ITS is to improve road safety and driving conditions
[7]. For example, by enrolling in the ITS, some critical driving conditions detected
by the in-vehicle embedded sensors could be shared with nearby vehicles or facil-
ity. Usually, VANETs are established with two types of communication, namely
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) com-
munication [26]. In V2V communication, vehicles communicate with nearby vehicles
to exchange information. Similarity, vehicles communicate with the infrastructure
installed along the road directly by the V2I communication. Dedicated short-range
communication (DSRC) radio [27] is the commonly used communication protocol
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for V2V and V2I communications in VANETs.
1.3.1 System Structure of VANETs
Figure 1.4: System model of VANETs
The architecture of VANETs involves various hardware and software compo-
nents. As shown in Figure 1.4, the VANET system consists of three major compo-
nents: OBU (On Board Unit), RSU (Road Side Unit) and trusted authority (TA).
OBU of each vehicle is connected with a sensor network to gather information such
as velocity, breaking information, etc. It can communicate with RSUs and OBUs of
other vehicles [28]. All RSUs along the road are interconnected with each other. TA
is connected to all the RSUs through a wired connection with the role in managing
the entire VANETs.
1) On Board Unit: Each vehicle is equipped with an OBU as a transceiver to
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communicate with RSUs and the other vehicles. OBU consists of resource command
processor (RCP), read/write storage, network device, and sensors. Sensors such as
global positioning system (GPS), tamper proof device (TPD), event data recorder
(EDR), speed sensor will collect information and send those readings back to the
OBU. Then OBU monitored and gathered the information to form messages, which
will be sent to neighboring vehicles and RSUs through wireless medium [28].
2) Roadside Unite: RSUs are generally stationary devices installed along the
roadside or at dedicated locations such as at intersections or parking spaces [29]. The
RSUs are equipped with network devices for dedicated short-range communication
with the OSU on vehicles as well as communication with the infrastructural network.
The main functions of RSUs include: (i) Extending the communication range of
VANETs by relaying the messages to other OBUs and RSUs. (ii) Running safety
applications such as traffic condition reporting or accident warning. (iii) Providing
Internet connectivity to OBUs.
3) Trusted Authority: TA is responsible for the trust and security man-
agement of the entire VANETs including verifying the authenticity of vehicles and
revoking nodes in the case of broadcasting fake messages or performing malicious
behavior [28]. Thus, the TA has high computational capability and sufficient storage
capability.
The ITS aims to provide solutions to road safety and the traffic congestion
problems. It improves the driving conditions by integrating information technology
in transport systems. Efficient communication channels play an essential role for the
ITS. Here, we will distinguish two possible types of communications in the VANETs:
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• Vehicle To Vehicle: V2V is communication between vehicles in the ad-hoc
mode. In this mode, a vehicle can receive, transmit or exchange valuable traffic
information such as traffic conditions and road accidents.
• Vehicle To Infrastructure: V2I is used to broadcast messages between
the network infrastructure and vehicles. It is usually for exchange of useful
information about road conditions and sensor measurements to be taken into
account. In this mode, a vehicle first establishes a connection with the RSU
and then communicates with external networks such as the Internet.
As a new emerging technology in transportation, VANETs differs from the
other ad-hoc networks as the basic entity in this network is fast moving vehicles.
To sum up, VANETs have the following unique characteristics compared to other
types of networks, :
1. Mobility: Vehicles in VANETs are normally moving at high speed. Therefore,
a little delay in V2V/V2I communication can result in many problems [30].
2. Dynamic Network Topology: The topology of VANETs is changing quickly
due to high mobility of the vehicles. This makes the VANETs vulnerable to
attacks and difficult to identify malicious vehicles.
3. Real-time Constraints: The transmission of information in VANETs has a
particular time limit range. This is designed to give the receiver sufficient
time to make decisions and take corresponding actions promptly.
4. Computing and Storage Capability: It is ordinary to process a large amount
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of information among vehicles and infrastructures in VANETs. Thus, the
computing and storage capability are absolutely a challenging issue.
5. Volatility: It is normal that the connections between two nodes in VANETs
just occur once because of their mobility. The connections between nodes
would remain for a limited period of time within a few wireless hops [31]. Thus,
it would be difficult to ensure the security of personal contacts in VANETs.
1.3.2 Security Issues for VANETs
The driving force behind VANETs is to provide comfort and safety to drivers
and passengers. Here, we outline the effective security mechanisms which should be
designed to ensure the appropriate operations of VANETs. The key security services
are availability, confidentiality, authenticity, data integrity and non-repudiation [28].
In Figure 1.5, the services and their corresponding threats are listed, which will be
elaborated next in this section.
Security Service in VANETs
Availablity Confidentiality Authenticity Integrity Non-repudiation
Deneial of Service (DoS) 
attack Jamming attack                 
Malware attack               
Broadcast tampering attack   
Black hole and gray hole 
attack Greedy behavior attack
Eavesdropping attack     
Traffic analysis attack 
Sybil attack               
Tunneling attack                
GPS spoofing          
Free-riding attack 
Message suppression attack 




Figure 1.5: Security services in VANETs and the corresponding threats and attacks
[1]
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• Availability: Availability is a critical security requirement for VANETs. It
ensures that the network and applications remain operational even in the
presence of faulty or malicious conditions [32]. Several attacks are designed
to break the availability of the VANETs. In this category, the most famous is
the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [33]. Inside or outside attackers perform
the DoS by jamming the communication channel or overriding the resources
in VANETs. The attackers may be distributed, which is the Distributed De-
nial of Service (DDoS) [34]. When malware is installed to operate the OBUs
and RSUs, attackers can penetrate into the VANETs to disrupt the normal
functionality.
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality guarantees that the data can be accessed
only by designated recipients who are not able to understand confidential
information that pertains to each entity [30]. If a mechanism lacks confiden-
tiality for the exchanged data in a vehicular network, exchanged messages are
particularly vulnerable to attacks such as the improper collection of clear in-
formation [35]. In these cases, the attacker can gather information about the
location of the vehicle or its routes, which may affect the privacy of individ-
uals. It is difficult to detect this kind of attack since it is virtually passive
and user currently is not aware of the collection. The typical example which
threatens confidentiality is the eavesdropping attack [36]. Eavesdropping is
the intentional attempt to get confidential information about the protected
data. The attacker could steal identity information or collect location data
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of a target vehicle in order to track that vehicle. The attacker may listen
to the message transmission and then analyze the frequency and duration of
messages to gather confidential information.
• Authenticity: Authentication is a mechanism to protect the VANETs against
the malicious entities, which is considered to be the first line of defense against
various attacks in VANETs [28]. All existing entities in the network must au-
thenticate before accessing available services. Any violation or attack involving
the process of identification or authentication exposes all the network to se-
rious consequences. Ensure authenticity in a vehicular network is to protect
the authentic nodes from outside or inside attackers infiltrating the network
using a falsified identity [35]. The importance of identificationauthentication
process comes from the fact that it is frequently used whenever a vehicle needs
to join the network or service. There are several types of attacks in this cat-
egory. For example, in Sybil attack, a malicious node forges a large number
of fake identities in order to disrupt the proper functioning of applications in
VANETs [37]. It makes an illusion to other vehicles that there is a traffic
jam and enforces them to change their routes so that the road will be left
clear. The authenticity is also threatened by the GPS spoofing attack. An
attacker can generate false GPS signals stronger than the original signals from
the trusted satellites to fool the vehicles to think that it is available in a dif-
ferent location [38]. In cooperative authentication scheme, vehicles may take
advantages of others’ authentication contributions and rarely make their own.
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Such selfish behavior is referred to as free-riding attack [39], which will pose a
serious threat to cooperative message authentication.
• Integrity: Integrity ensures that the content of a message is not modified dur-
ing transmission, which protects against the unauthorized creation, destruc-
tion or modification of data. The integrity might be hindered by the following
attacks. The most common is the message suppression/fabrication/alteration
attack. The attacker alters some part of the transmitting message to bring
about an unauthorized effect [40]. The masquerading attacker enters into the
VANETs system as a valid user with stolen passwords and creates false mes-
sages [41]. The attackers may continuous re-inject previously received beacons
and messages back on to the network, which will confuse the traffic authorities
when identifying the vehicles in emergency incidents [42].
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation in security means the ability to verify
that the sender and the receiver are the entities who claim to have respectively
sent or received the message [43]. The non-repudiation of data origin proves
that data has been sent and the non-repudiation of arrival proves that they
were received. In the VANETs’ context, since the manipulated data related
to the safety and privacy of the users, it should be always possible to verify all
hardware and software changes of security settings and applications (update,
modification, addition, etc.) [44].
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1.3.3 Trust Models for VANETs
Trust management is an inherent issue in VANETs. Various authentication
methods are developed to ensure the messages are sent from legitimate vehicles.
However, it cannot prevent a legitimate or internal vehicle from broadcasting bogus
or altered messages malevolently. These bogus or altered messages may not only
decrease transportation efficiency but also will cause accidents that may threaten
human’s life [45]. For example, vehicle A broadcasts a warning message to notice
the vehicles behind it that vehicle A is out of control. When vehicle B receives this
warning, it is crucial for B to determine the trustworthiness of the message and take
a quick response. In this case, it is impractical to ask neighbor vehicles or trusted
third party (TTP) for help due to the urgent time constraint. If this warning message
is bogus, it is dangerous for vehicle B to brake hard. As a result, how to establish
trust among authenticated vehicles becomes a serious issue. It is desirable that each
vehicle in VANETs can detect dishonest vehicles and the malicious messages sent
by them.
Because of the unique characteristics of VANETs, some challenges are pre-
sented for trust management such as decentralization and scalability [46]. More-
over, it is common that two vehicles may interact with each other just for one time
and there is no guarantee to meet in the future [47]. Thus, it is impossible to de-
pend on centralized systems such as TTP to build long-term relationships. Here,
we summarized the popular trust models applied in VANETs.
• Entity-centric Trust Models: Entity-centric trust models focus on evalu-
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ating the trustworthiness of vehicles by establishing a reputation system or
making a decision according to the opinions of neighbors. Several typical
works based on this scheme have been proposed. Minhas et al. [48] develop
a multifaceted trust modeling approach to detect entities that are generating
malicious data. This method incorporates role-, experience-, priority-, and
majority-based trust to make real-time decisions. Mrmol et al. [49] propose
a trust and reputation infrastructure-based proposal (TRIP) for VANETs to
quickly and accurately distinguish malicious or selfish nodes with the help of
RSUs. TRIP takes into account three different sources of information when
calculating the reputation score for each node: direct previous experiences
with the targeting node, recommendations from other surrounding vehicles
and, when available, the recommendation provided by a central authority.
Haddadou et al. [50] propose a distributed trust model to allocate credits to
nodes and securely manage these credits. It creates self-selection among the
network’s nodes and exhausts the credit for those nodes with bad behavior.
Generally, the correctness of data from other vehicles can be guaranteed. Due
to the high mobility of vehicles, it is difficult to collect enough information to
calculate the reputation score of a specific node. Moreover, how to ensure the
security of the reputation system itself is another critical issue that has not
been resolved.
• Data-centric Trust Models: Data-centric trust models focus on proving the
trustworthiness of the received data. In order to verify the trustworthiness of
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the received data accurately, the models need cooperative information from
various sources such as neighbor vehicles or RSUs. Gurung et al. [51] propose
a trust model to directly evaluate the trustworthiness of a message based on
various factors such as content similarity, content conflict, and route similar-
ity. Huang et al. [52] develop a voting system with different voting weights
according to the distance from the event. The opinion from the vehicle closer
to the event possesses higher weight when evaluating the trustworthiness of
a message. Rawat et al. [53] propose a deterministic approach to evaluate
the trust level of the received message by using received signal strength (RSS)
for determining the vehicle’s geolocation (position coordinate). Hussain et al.
[54] suggest email-based trust and social network based trust to establish and
manage data level trust. The main limitations of data-centric trust models
are latency and data sparsity. Respectively, a large number of data from vari-
ous sources may contain redundant information, which will increase latency or
overwhelm the significant information. On the contrary, data sparsity is preva-
lent in VANETs. It is unrealistic for data-centric trust models to perform well
without enough information.
• Combined Trust Models: Both entity and data based trustworthiness are
considered in this category. Combined trust models not only evaluate the trust
level of vehicles but also calculate the trustworthiness of data [55]. Thus, these
models inherit both the benefits and drawbacks of entity-centric and data-
centric trust models. Attack-resistant trust management scheme proposed by
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Li et al. [55] evaluates the trustworthiness of both data and mobile nodes to
cope with malicious attacks in VANETs. Trustworthiness of data is evaluated
based on the received data from multiple vehicles. Trustworthiness of a node
is determined based on functional trust and recommendation trust, which
respectively indicates whether a node can fulfill its function and what is the
trust level of it.
1.4 Hardware Assisted Solutions for Automobile Security
1.4.1 Motivations of the Dissertation Research
Nowadays, automobiles have evolved from mechanical devices to connected
communication platforms. Approximately 50-100 ECUs are installed in vehicles
nowadays and they are no longer isolated from the outside world. Indeed, smart
features such us adaptive cruise control, autonomous steering/parking, lane keep-
ing etc. are enabled by ECU controller and widely deployed in the vehicle system.
Each ECU is assigned with several functions and should be able to connect and
share messages through the bus system. CAN is the most commonly used proto-
col which allows the ECU to control the vehicle maneuvers by sending and sharing
messages through its bus system with the guarantee of timing predictability and
fault-tolerance for communication. Unfortunately, CAN has no mechanism for sup-
porting security protocols or for ensuring message confidentiality and integrity by
primary design. The lack of security in CAN bus has aroused much attention in
both industry and research. Moreover, the potential for interference in such attacks
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is exacerbated by the increasing external connections with the in-vehicle control
network, including USB ports, Bluetooth, the mandatory OBD-II port and the ex-
tended connection to the VANETs [56].
Come to the VANETs related applications, GPS spoofing attack on vehicle
is a typical example. Nowadays, each vehicle of the VANETs is required to be
equipped with a positioning system (receiver) to achieve the applications in com-
munication and data sharing. GPS is typically used by the vehicle or the driver
for self-localization and navigation but the technology is also used for remote traf-
fic surveillance and collision avoidance on the VANETs. Despite for the in-vehicle
threatens, The major goal of spoofing attacks on an automobile GPS system is to
produce erroneous position signals to fool the navigation systems. Since many of the
functions and applications in VANETs are dependent on the civilian GPS signals
to locate and synchronize in the network, successful GPS spoofing attack can not
only hinder the location based applications but also facilitates other cyber attacks
as well (i.e., Sybil attack on VANETs). Besides, it is crucial for the VANETs to
prevent internal vehicles from broadcasting forged messages while simultaneously
preserving the privacy of vehicles against tracking attacks. However, there are some
challenges aroused by the intrinsic features of the VANETs, as the high mobility
makes it unpractical to build long-term interaction among vehicles. As a result, the
topology always changes rapidly in VANETs as well, which require an efficient but
low-cost verification for the enrolled vehicles of the network.
To mitigate those serious attacks aroused or to solve the bottlenecks of ensur-
ing security around vehicles, several techniques have been proposed for integrating
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security into the current CAN architecture and the VANETs [57, 58]. Similar to
traditional secure systems, these techniques rely on secure provisioning cryptogra-
phy algorithms, e.g., adding MAC scheme on CAN bus, applying encryption on the
GPS signal and establishing trust model based on cryptographic algorithms. How-
ever, using those standard and traditional cryptographic techniques to protect data
originality and integrity may violate timing constraints for both CAN and VANETs
communications. As a result, in this dissertation, we focus on searching some light-
weight schemes to handle those security vulnerabilities around the vehicles.
Specifically, we start from investigating the features of CAN protocol and pro-
posed automotive Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be applied without causing
computational and communication overhead in the CAN protocol. Because of its
self-adaptive nature, IDS can be easily adapted in the automotive domain as a seam-
less extension to new vehicles. We then take use the CAN infrastructure to assist the
originality in GPS spoofing detection without any further hardware costs on equip-
ment. Besides, we also brought up a blockchain based trust management system.
Blockchain is believed to be a secure and decentralized computational infrastruc-
tures, which could provide a disruptive solutions for the problems of centralization,
privacy and security when storing, tracking, monitoring and sharing data. The veri-
fication process assisted by blockchain is light-weight thus it is a promising candidate
for implementing the certification verification on VANETs. We exploit the features
of block-chain to establish distributed trust management while simultaneously pro-
tect the privacy of vehicles for the VANETs.
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1.4.2 Contributions of the Dissertation Research
To address these security issues aroused around the vehicles, we are aiming to
find security solutions for the automobiles in this dissertation. Specifically, we are
focusing on several security primitives: IDS, side channel attacks, spoofing attacks,
trust models and blockchains.
In sum, the contributions of this work are highlighted as the following:
• First, we present two effective IDSs for the CAN network. The first IDS relies
on monitoring the entropy changes on the identifier field of the CAN frame.
This entropy-based IDS is designed to cover the common CAN messages injec-
tion attacks. The other one is based on the physical layout of CAN network
which could detect compromised ECUs by identifying the changes of delay.
These physical property-based IDS could identify injection attacks as well as
impersonation attacks by fingerprinting the sender ECU.
• Then, we study the vulnerabilities along with the PnS-CAN protocol. We
identify that the characteristics of CAN bus can be utilized to extract the
secret key during execution of the protocol. To demonstrate this, we have
launched successfully side-channel attacks on this protocol.
• Next, we move the scope from the internal vehicle CAN bus protocol to exter-
nal vehicle applications. By making use of the informative CAN bus data, we
proposed a low-cost GPS spoofing detection method. Besides, the data col-
lected from the in-vehicle network is believed to be authenticated and trusted
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by the IDS we proposed, which does not need any interference by the third
parties.
• Finally, we exploit the features of block-chain to establish distributed trust
management while simultaneously protect the privacy of vehicles for the VANETs.
All the messages are recorded in the blockchain as persistent evidence to fur-
ther evaluate the reputation score. The reputation score provides an incentive
for internal vehicles to prevent misbehaviors.
1.4.3 Organization of the Dissertation Research
In this dissertation, we first propose two kinds of IDS on the CAN bus sys-
tem and demonstrate their functions to detect three types of regular attacks on
bus. The details of this work are illustrated in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we study
the new key exchange protocol, i.e, the Plug-and-Secure protocol with CAN bus
(PnS-CAN), and investigate the physical leakage on this protocol. Besides, by uti-
lizing the rich in-vehicle data, we build a GPS spoofing detector for automobile
applications as illustrated in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, We design a trust model to
improve the trustworthiness of messages sent on the VANETs, which is based on the
blockchain technology. At last, we conclude in Chapter 6, with future work direc-
tions in machine learning based IDS solutions and high-efficient blockchain solution
for VANETs .
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Chapter 2: Intrusion Detection Systems for CAN bus
2.1 Introduction
With the recent aggressive push of autonomous vehicles, many ECUs are intro-
duced for data processing and communications between inside the vehicle network
(through the CAN bus) and the VANETs [59]. Moreover, the applications of the
vehicle network make the vehicle as a connected device to the Internet of Things
(IoT), not just a traditional physical part. As vehicles adopt more connectivity func-
tions to the external network, security threats on electronic controllers of vehicles
are highly rising. With safety remains the most important concern for automakers,
security is now gaining lots of attention because a compromised ECU or faked com-
munication messages can cause fatal failures just like mechanical problems. It has
been shown that attacks can be successfully launched on cars to cause severe impacts
on the normal driving behaviors [3, 5]. Indeed, the security level of vehicles should
be set higher than those for other smart devices because cars could become critical
threats to human life once they are attacked. By injecting malicious CAN messages
through those ports, the attacker could cause intentional malfunctions to a wide set
of components including the engine, instrument panel, radio, heating, lights, brakes,
etc. These attacks are primarily facilitated by injection from the connecting ports
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to the CAN bus network. Despite the injection attack on the CAN bus, another
kind of attack as the masquerade attack has gained increasing attention nowadays.
This kind of attack is more severe than the regular injection attack as the attacker
hide his identity when launching the intrusion which is difficult for the system to
discover. To efficiently defend this, one possible method is to find out the real sender
by fingerprinting the sender ECU.
When the in-vehicle serial communication network was designed in the late
1980s, there was only about 1% electronic equipment in the vehicle system. Thus
the original design requirements of such network at that time were merely to connect
the limited in-vehicle ECUs. A simple message broadcasting based communication
protocol, known as the CAN, was used for this purpose without any consideration
of security. Not surprisingly, due to its lack of security concerns and protection,
CAN’s vulnerabilities are exposed to the attackers and become a major target for
a variety of threat models. Those successful attacks demonstrate that without the
intrusion detection or authentication methods, it becomes very challenging for the
CAN-based communication network to defend emerging attacks such as message
replays, injections, and modification [60, 61]. Nevertheless, the important role that
CAN plays in the communication of vehicular systems has made it an irreplaceable
component and thus the research community has continued its efforts in seeking
secure and efficient protection method for the CAN network.
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2.2 Countermeasures and Current Status of IDS
As discussed above, the simple design of CAN bus makes it vulnerable to cyber
attacks from the outside and security has become the primary issue. Generally
speaking, there are two kinds of countermeasures to defend against attacks on CAN
bus: message authentication and intrusion detection.
Message authentication code (MAC) has been successfully used in other se-
curity applications, but it is highly restricted by the nature of CAN that was not
designed for security. Several cryptographic techniques have been proposed for in-
tegrating security into the current architecture [57, 58, 62]. Similar to traditional
secure systems, these techniques rely on secure provisioning of symmetric keys within
the nodes on the CAN bus. However, secure and robust provisioning, maintenance
and update of cryptographic keys within the automotive supply chain can incur
significant overhead and may require changes to the automotive manufacturing and
servicing facilities. The implementation is also limited by the payload of the CAN
message which is only 64 bits. For example, if we want to implement SHA256 with
CAN bus payload, it will need 8 messages to finish an authentication code. Obvi-
ously, it will introduce inevitable delays for the whole system. This stems from the
fact that the CAN protocol allows only for 64 bits to be used for payload. That
is, implementing the SHA256, for example, using the CAN protocol will lead to an
overhead of eight messages to carry the computed SHA256 code; an 800% increase
in the communication bandwidth. This large increase in the communication band-
width will degrade the performance of the system in terms of its ability to satisfying
29
the required hard timing constraints. When the message is safety critical, such as
emergency stop, this could result in a life-threatening incident.
To ensure the security of the CAN bus and reduce the complexity introduced
by cryptographic algorithms, intrusion detection systems are proposed to employed
with the CAN protocol. The aim to develop IDS is to detect anomalies on the
messages and alert the system when monitoring the bus transmissions. Existing
automotive IDSs can be summarized into two categories: message-content (data)
based IDS and physical-based IDS. First, data-based IDS usually focuses on the
messages transmitted through the bus to find any abnormal in the contents or
sequence. The data contents would be changed if the attacker presents includes the
message ID [63], the payload [64] and the frequency [65] or message sequences [66].
By taking use of information theory models or machine learning models [67], the
changes from the contents could be detected. The advantage of data-based IDS is
that it is easy to detect data alteration/fabrication attacks and spoofing attacks with
appropriate pre-learned models. But the drawbacks are that it could not efficiently
identify the impersonation attacks. For example, if ECU A shuts down ECU B
using bus-off attack, and then he could impersonate ECU B by sending malicious
messages on the bus, which is difficult to be detected by the content-based IDSs. On
the contrary, the other main kind of IDSs, the physical-based attacks, are monitoring
the changes of physical related properties on the bus, e.g., the clock-skew, the voltage
level and the transmission delays. By exploring the clock-skew of different ECUs,
it could fingerprint the sender of the malicious messages [68]. The other voltage-
based attacker identification takes use of the voltages changes on the network to
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identify the attacker ECU. The first proposed voltage based scheme is called Viden,
which exploits the voltage measurements to construct and update the transmitter
ECUs’ voltage profiles as their fingerprints [69]. VoltageIDS is also a voltage-based
IDS, it is the first automotive IDS capable of distinguishing between errors and the
bus-off attack [70]. Those physical-based IDS would require attack samples about
measurements to training its model. Hence, it ends up being unpractical since it is
not feasible to apply with the vehicle system.
2.3 Adversary Models and Attack Scenarios
Before introducing the IDS framework, we first define and elaborate the ad-
versary models in this section. Specifically, we would describe the attack interfaces
which the adversary would take advantage use and also the specific attack scenarios
we try to tackle for the proposed IDS work.
2.3.1 Attack Interfaces
The main goal of the adversary is to transmit malicious CAN messages inten-
tionally causing malfunctions of the vehicle without being suspected by the detection
mechanism. Car hacking experiments show that the attack interfaces the adversary
could get access to the in-vehicle communication network are restricted to several
locations. Usually, the adversary would invade the in-vehicle network through two
common physical attack surfaces: either by directly plugging into the OBD-II port
or using remote wireless communication interface. As shown in Figure 2.1, both the
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OBD-II port under the driving panel and the antenna on the roof are circled. For
the directly wired insertion, the attacker can insert his device to collect CAN log
data through the OBD-II port. For the wireless connection, the attacker can use the
wireless channel to inject messages through the ECU attached to the antenna. In
most cases, the positions the adversary uses are fixed on the vehicle during the at-
tack. Once set up the attack interface, it is unnecessary for the adversary to change
it. For the accessibility of the adversary model, we assume that the adversary can
compromise an in-vehicle ECU through numerous attack surfaces, and thus gain its
control. Once an ECU is compromised, we consider the adversary to be capable of
performing at least the following malicious actions. The adversary can inject mes-
sage with forged IDs or his legal IDs, change the frequency of the messages. Also,
since CAN is a broadcast bus, the adversary can sniff messages on the CAN bus.
Figure 2.1: The attack interfaces of CAN bus and the CAN bus layout in real vehicle
[2]
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All the facts discussed above are considered as the general adversary model
for our proposed two kinds of IDS. For the entropy-based IDS which relies on mon-
itoring the changes on the contents, we consider the attacker can take use of both
the physical connection and wirelessly connected interfaces, there are no significant
differences for which interface the attacker applied, since the behavior we try to
monitor belongs to digital signal (i.e., whether this bit is 0 or 1).
For the delay-based physical IDS, which relies on the physical location to de-
tect the adversary. We consider an adversary that is capable of injecting malicious
messages on the CAN bus through the fixed ports. However, we assume that the
adversary has no capability in modifying the physical layout of the CAN bus. The
only method he could modify the layout is by breaking into the vehicle, which could
make it discovered easily. Also, even though he could break into the layout and
install the malicious ECU, he could not dynamically change the location of the ma-
licious ECU. During the injection, the adversary can only modify the identifier and
the contents of the messages, which is the same as the general injection assumption.
2.3.2 Specific Attack Types
2.3.2.1 Injection Attack
A straightforward yet quite threatening attack on the CAN bus is the message
injection attack. To achieve this, the adversary first connects to the in-vehicle
network through the interface and then starts to inject malicious messages onto the
CAN bus. The proposed injection attack typically involves injecting fake packets
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with modified identifiers and phony data values. This injection attack is the main
focus for the contents based IDS, which refers to our first proposed entropy-based
IDS. Therefore, when discussing the content-based IDS, we would like to elaborate
on this type of attack by two sub-groups: the strong injection attack and the weak
injection attack. Meanwhile, we propose four specific injection attack scenarios
to test the effects of our entropy-based IDS which naturally falls into these two
categories. The practicability of such an adversary model has already been proved
and demonstrated in [22, 68].
For the weak adversary model as shown in Figure 2.2, the comprised ECU
can only send out messages with the specific IDs assigned to it. That is to say, the
attacker is restricted in selecting CAN IDs for malicious messages. This mechanism
relies on the transmitter filter installed outside of the ECU to stop the malicious
messages without valid ID sending on the CAN bus. To hamper the communications
on the CAN bus, a weak attacker can only send messages with limited IDs, which
are legal to the filter.
Under this weak adversary injection model, we design one specific attack which
would be tested in the entropy-based IDS.
(Weak Adversary Model - Messages Injection with Fixed CAN ID): This
scenario is categorized as week model because the attackers can only control the
ECU, but cannot control the transmitter filter. That is to say, the attacker can
only transmit the fraudulent messages with assigned IDs. Even though the control
power is limited in the weak model, the attacker can also break the availability of the
CAN bus system by sending out useless massive messages into the bus system. That
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Figure 2.2: Weak attack model for the CAN bus. Here, the attacker can only send
ID A0 on the bus
happens when the dummy messages sent by the attacker are dominant the original
messages transmitted at this time. By manipulating the frequency of messages, the
attacker can gain the bus control just using a limited number of CAN IDs.
In contrast, for the strong attack model, the attacker could send out messages
with any IDs on the CAN bus, which is illustrated in Figure 2.3. Thus, the attacker
with strong capabilities would realize in hampering the communication on CAN bus
by two purposes. First, the adversary could send malicious messages with higher
priority IDs (leading zeros are in the front, e.g. 0000XXX) to override any periodic
messages sent by a legitimate safety-critical ECU. Those malicious messages might
be targeted to some operational receivers as the victim ECUs. As a result, the
receiver ECUs would get distracted, inoperable or executing errors. Second, by
sending messages with higher priority IDs, the compromised ECU could win the
bus arbitration for a period of time and stop the legal ECUs sending their regular
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messages, which indeed hinders the regular operations of the CAN bus. In other
words, the adversary could maliciously stress the bus and compromise the usability
of the other users just like flooding attacks.
By considering this strong attack capability, we designed three corresponding
specific attack scenarios listed as follows,
(Strong Adversary Model - Flooding Message Injection): In this scenario,
the attacker aims to break the availability of the CAN bus by sending out useless
massive messages on the bus. The attacker could completely control a compromised
ECU in this scenario. This kind of attack is usually accomplished by injecting CAN
messages containing the most dominant identifier, i.e. 0x00. But this assumption is
challenged by the CAN transceivers have the detection mechanism for zero overloads
on the CAN bus. Specifically, if the transceiver sees the bus is always transmitting
0 (high voltage), it will automatically shut down the transmission by pulling the
high voltage to low. A more efficient strategy for the attacker which avoids being
exposed to the transceiver detection mechanism could be an attempt in sending
messages with changeable IDs. This modified flooding attack mislead the detection
mechanism and is difficult to be discovered by the transceivers. Besides, as there
are no specific receivers for those malicious messages on the bus, which makes the
abnormal traffics could not be reported by the victim receivers as well. As a result,
the attacker should make a trade-off between the number of injected IDs and expo-
sure to the detection system. For instance, if the attacker keeps sending flooding
messages with changeable IDs, those messages will overwhelm the regular commu-
nications and cause significant changes on the CAN bus. On the other hand, the
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attacker will expose himself to the detection scheme by making obvious changes on
the CAN bus. As a sequence, if the compromised ECU is easy to be found out and
shut down forever, it cannot mount attacks on the CAN bus anymore.
(Strong Adversary Model - Message Injection with Single CAN ID): In
contrast to the flooding scenario discussed above, the attacker could narrow down the
number of IDs he uses to conceal himself from the abnormal detection schemes. Let
us suppose in this scenario, the attacker injects the malicious messages with single
CAN ID for two purposes: first, he wants to win the bus arbitration from the other
low priority IDs thus stopping the transmission of useful messages on the bus; second,
the malicious attacker could manipulate the contents of messages meaningfully and
send them out with the fixed ID which would disturb the functions of the receiver
ECUs. From the above discussion, we can find out that the second task is the
following extension of the first one. The attacker can choose from those two tasks
according to his purpose. If he only focuses on disturbing the CAN bus as the first
task, he can arbitrarily select the injected ID from the whole ID set. Otherwise, if he
wants to achieve both the first task and the second, he needs to carefully select the
injected ID from the ID set and use it for a targeted function. As mentioned before,
the distribution of CAN ID is assigned by the vehicle manufacturer and only around
10% to 20% IDs are used in the CAN network, e.g. for the 2016 Ford Fusion we used
for testing, only 223 IDs are valid, which takes 10.88 % of the whole ID set (2048
in total). The other IDs are never used by any ECUs in this car. For this scenario,
we assume that the injected IDs are picked from the valid CAN ID pool. From the
other aspect, this attack can be categorized as the increasing frequency attack [22],
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which the specific IDs are sending out with higher rates. And the author proposed
to counting the time interval of each ID to detect the injection. However, collecting
and calculating the time interval of all ECUs would introduce delay overhead, it is
infeasible for the device to respond in real-time.
(Strong Adversary Model - Message Injection with Multiple IDs): The
same attack set-up as the second scenario, but this time we assume that there
are multiple attackers with different injected IDs, or the attacker chooses to inject
messages with multiple IDs. That is to say, the balance of the bus would be disturbed
by two or more CAN IDs. This makes inferring the faked IDs more difficult as the
multiple sources would influence the ID distribution together and it is not easy to
figure out who is the malicious ID. But on the contrary, multiple participated IDs
may also cause entropy changing tremendously on the CAN bus, which makes the
alert detection more confident.
Figure 2.3: Strong attack model for the CAN bus. Here, the attacker can send
arbitrary ID on the bus
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The physical IDS will be able to detect those aggressive injection attack dis-
cussed above. However, since it could be also detected by the other contents based
IDS instances as well, we would put this kind of attack on low priority and would em-
phasize the superior detection capability for the other, more sophisticated attacks,
discussed as follows.
2.3.2.2 Masquerade Attack
Masquerade attack is a kind of sophisticated in-vehicle attack first proposed
and demonstrated in [68]. The objective of a masquerade attack is to manipulate
an ECU that is in charge of a safe-critical function while hiding the fact that the
ECU is compromised. To mount a masquerade attack without being detected, an
adversary needs to suspend a target ECU and then inject malicious CAN messages
without notice by the other ECUs. When a legitimate ECU is incapacitated, the
masquerading ECU would broadcast fake packets in its place at the same frequency
or it takes other action to cover any broadcast time-shifts. In fact, for the masquer-
ade attack, the CAN ID and message contents may not change based on the attack
strategy, thus making it difficult to be detected by the contents based IDS. How-
ever, after taking over the transmission of the legitimate ECU, the attacker starts
to transmit malicious messages at a different physical location. Therefore, another
detection option considered in this chapter is proposed to detect the masquerade
attack by utilizing the information from the physical layer of transmission.
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2.3.2.3 Bus-off Attack
The bus-off attack is proposed by [22]. In this attack, an adversary who has
an remote access to the in-vehicle network performs simultaneous transmission of
bits in fields other than the identifier field. Due to this simultaneous transmission,
a target ECU will enter the bus-off mode with loss of the bus transmission. As a
result, the bus-off attacker can intentionally suspend the target ECU. The bus-off
attack could be achieved with both the wireless injection and the direct attached
injection through the OBD-II port. No matter which attack interface is applied,
the location for the injection is fixed on the bus. Also to launch the bus-off attack,
it usually requires several cycles (128 or 256) to make the counter overflow thus
entering into the bus-off mode. To tackle this bus-off attack, one solution is to
distinguish the transmitters even though they simultaneously transmit the message
bits. The counter capacity in terms assist to accumulate the delay changes over the
cycles. Our proposed delay-based plug-in-monitor IDS could achieve this by finding
the delay difference of the two transmitters, as the bad ECU is supposed to transmit
at a different location from the legitimate ECU. Accordingly, we could detect the
malicious messages generated from the attack ECU in the bus-off attack as well.
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2.4 Entropy-based Approach
2.4.1 Framework of Entropy-based Intrusion Detection System
Our proposed entropy-based IDS is deploying on the 11-bit identifier part of
the CAN frame. We will discuss the implementation details in this section.
2.4.1.1 ID Binary Entropy Definition
The identifier (11 bits) in CAN frame represents the message’s priority as well
as its functions, but without the transmitter or receiver information. For example,
a message containing wheel speed values might have ID=0x31, and the message
which contains the engine temperature values has the other ID such as ID=0x20.
Notice that the IDs are assigned by the manufacturers, and even are distinct among
different models from the same manufacturer. Only one ECU is assigned to transmit
a given ID at a time, but one ECU could have multiple assigned IDs for different
functions. Besides, several ECUs might be allowed to transmit the same ID, but not
at the same time. That is to say, a specific ID is not unique for one ECU and could
be received by different receivers as well. Indeed, traffic in automotive networks is
much more restricted. Every packet in a vehicular CAN network and its possible
data content are specified. The permitted value range is defined as well as the length
of every signal and the packet function. The basic frame format has an 11-bit ID,
whereas an extended format has a 29-bit ID. We will use the basic CAN ID format
(11-bit) because it is much more prevalent, however, the detection method proposed
41
here is not dependent on the type of format, and it could also be applied to the
extended format.
We use the probability of ‘1’ occurrence at each bit to represent the distribution
of that bit. As defined in the following,
Definition: pi = # of messages where Bit i is 1/total number of messages.
The range of pi is from [0,1]. The binary entropy function H(p) is defined as the
entropy of a Bernoulli process with probability p. If Pr(X == 1) = p, then Pr(X ==
0) = 1− p and the entropy of X in Shannon is given by
H(X) = Hb(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) (2.1)
Our proposed entropy-based IDS is deploying on the 11-bit identifier part of the
CAN frame. We will discuss the implementation details in this section.
2.4.1.2 Entropy-based Detection Scheme
The first step of the ID entropy detection approach is to generate the golden
template by calculating the binary entropy in regular communications. Data col-
lected from the real CAN bus in a 2016 Ford Fusion vehicle shows that the entropy
values are steady under normal driving maneuvers. The raw CAN data we collected
are from different driving situations, e.g. turning the audio on, turning the light on,
driving with cruise control and so on. We observe that the entropy distribution on
each bit of ID field only changes slightly in these different testing scenarios. The
variation is small (e.g., from the range 1e−8 to 9e−8) which is confident to prove
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that the entropy is steady under normal driving. Therefore, we build the golden
model based on the normal CAN bus data which later can be used to compare with
the CAN bus data under attack. If the entropy value changes significantly from the
golden template, it will be classified as being attacked. The golden entropy value
of the in-vehicle network is generated from 35 different real road tests on the 2016
Ford Fusion, including the road tests and the engine tests.
Let Ĥ = {H1H2H3 · · ·H11} be the binary entropy vector measured from the real
CAN log data. We get the golden template Ĥtemp by averaging 35 measurements
from diverse driving behaviors. For each bit in the template as Hi ∈ Ĥtemp, we
calculate the range of it as max(Hi)−min(Hi). And the threshold for detection can
be acquired as a positive multiple of the range, expressed as Th = κ(max(Hi) −
min(Hi)), where κ is the coefficient which determines the margin of the threshold.
The value of κ is chosen from κ = [3, 10] empirically. In this experiment, we choose
κ =5. The golden template extracted from the regular communications on CAN bus
is shown in Figure 2.4. The template is an 11-bit vector as we measure the binary
entropy for each bit.
In the detection procedure, we compare the binary entropy to the template
and calculate the entropy change bit by bit. If the entropy change is larger than
the threshold, we will suspect that the CAN bus is under intrusion attack, and the
system will send an alert signal. If the entropy change is below the threshold, this
change will be treated as a normal drift.
Figure 2.4 illustrates one example of binary entropy changes due to the injec-
tion attack. The golden template is represented in left side colored in red and the
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Figure 2.4: Golden template and an example when injection attack causes changes
on the identifier bit
entropy result under attack is shown on the right side. First, it is evident to figure
out some changes of bits, e.g., Bit 6, Bit 7 and Bit 11. On the occurrence changes at
some specific bits, we attempt to infer the malicious ID from the difference between
the test entropy and the golden template. As Figure 2.4 shows, Bit 11 changes in
positive direction, i.e., from 0 to 1. As a result, we can infer that the injected ID
would be 1 on Bit 11. On the contrary, negative values would indicate that this
bit of malicious ID is probably to be 0. Therefore, we could eventually infer the
malicious IDs by monitoring the bit changes in several positions. For example, the
most possible injected ID, in this case, could be xxxxx00xxx1 (x means unknown
for this bit). From this clue, we could narrow down the space for searching the
malicious ID.
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2.4.2 Evaluation and Experimental Results
In this section, we first discuss and define the metrics used to evaluate the
detection system. And then we present our experimental results got from tested in
the attack scenarios discussed before, which demonstrate that our entropy detection
system is effective on the discussed types of attacks.
2.4.2.1 Experiment Set-up
For the application of the information-theoretic measures introduced above,
access to the network traffic of a vehicle is required. In our set-up, we use the
Vehicle Spy 3 Professional software tool connecting a 2016 Ford Fusion internal
CAN network through the OBD-II port. And the baud rate is set as the standard
for the CAN network: 125M bit/s for the middle-speed CAN and 500M bit/s for the
high-speed CAN. We conduct our tests and experiments on the data acquired from
the middle-speed CAN bus in this section, however, our detection method would
also work for high-speed CAN bus.
2.4.2.2 Injection Rate and Detection Rate
We define the Injection rate Ir as the proportion of successfully injected mes-
sages on the bus over the total number of messages the malicious ECU sends to
compete for the bus arbitration. The injection rate is relevant to the priority of the
message which represents its capability to mount the CAN bus. As the CAN bus’s
arbitration relies on the numeric of ID, different IDs would win the bus arbitration
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with different probabilities. For example, if the regular message transmitting on the
bus has a higher priority ID, the attacker would fail to send his malicious message
on the CAN bus. The number of times the attacker win the bus over the total times
he tries in a fixed period of time should be a good metric to evaluate the capability
of the CAN ID, which is the injection rate defined here. On the other hand, if the
attacker wants to accomplish his attack, he needs to select the proper ID in assisting
him to win the bus arbitration. For instance, if the attacker chooses the IDs with
higher priority (smaller value in decimal), he would have more chances to win the
bus arbitration, which in turn results in increasing the number of injected messages
overall.
We calculate the injection rate defined above and select some typical IDs from
the CAN log data and the results are shown in Figure 2.5. The Injection rate is
high when the numeric value of ID is smaller and will decrease with the numeric
value of ID increases. That is due to the arbitration scheme of CAN bus as on bit
level bit 0 always dominants bit 1. The injection rate is significant as it represents
the destructive power of the attacker and also it highly relates to the detection rate
which we will explain in the following.
The detection rate as Dr in our intrusion system is defined as the proportion of
successfully detected attacks over the total number of attacks. In a period evaluation
time (e.g., 5s), if the detection system observes the entropy changes is above the
threshold, it will treat this attack as detected. That is to say, the detection rate is
the proportion of attacks that are correctly identified.
Obviously, the detection rate is highly related to the entropy changes on the
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Figure 2.5: Injection and detection results for different identifiers
CAN bus. And the entropy change is influenced by the number of injected messages.
Moreover, the number of injected messages depends on three parameters: the injec-
tion rate Ir of a specific ID, the injection frequency f . Thus, the total number of
successfully injected messages can be expressed as a product shown in the formula
#of injected messages = Ir × f (2.2)
If the malicious attacker attempts to increase the success rate of injection
during a fixed period of time, he should either choose the ID with higher injection
rate or increase the injection frequency. To demonstrate the relationship between
injection rate and detection rate, we test 15 selected IDs under the same injection
frequency f and evaluation period T0.
As the results are shown in Figure 2.5, the detection rate (blue line) decreases
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along with the injection rate. That is because the total number of injected messages
on the CAN bus would decrease which makes the entropy changes imperceptible. As
a result of this, the detection rate of this scenario would decrease. The conclusion
is that for just single ID injection attack, if we keep the inject frequency the same,
the detection rate (sensitivity) is positively correlated to the injection rate.
2.4.2.3 Inferring Malicious IDs
The entropy-based IDS we designed will accomplish two tasks: 1) Detect the
entropy changes and demonstrate the evidence of the attack; 2) Find out the injected
IDs along the messages and alert to the system for those malicious IDs. Here, we
will discuss how to infer the malicious IDs based on the changes of the entropy
observed on CAN bus.
Continued with the example discussed before, if we observe the first bit of ID
(Bit 1) changes, we can infer the corresponding bit based on the direction of changes.
Assume the Bit 1 changes in negative direction (decreases), the corresponding bit
of the ID will be 0 of high probability. Then we can select those IDs in the ID pool
whose first bit is 0 as the candidates. By continuing this procedure and combined
observed changes on the other the bits, the range of candidates would be narrow
down. However, this inference is non-deterministic as we have no clues on the other
unchanged bit, which could be either 0 or 1. As a result, we propose a rank selection
method to evaluate the accuracy of the hit rate when searching the malicious ID.
The procedure works as follows, we select the first n rank IDs as the candidates
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which meet the constraints derived from the entropy changes. If the malicious one
is in the candidate set, we will mark this detection as a hit. We use the hit rate to
evaluate the efficiency of the inferring. Due to the arbitration rule in CAN bus; the
ID would be more powerful in the injection if the most significant bits are 0. As a
result, we sort the IDs in ascending order, which means the preceding elements in
the sorted list would have a greater probability to be the malicious target. Then,
we search the target from the candidate set. If there is a hit, we will mark this
as a successful detection. By calculating the hit rate, we can evaluate the success
and effectiveness of our IDS system. The results of hit rate (inferring accuracy) for
different attack scenarios are shown in Table 2.1. For all the tests in our experiment,
we set rank=10, which indicates each time we select the first 10 identifiers as the
candidates.
2.4.2.4 Results Analysis of Different Attack Scenarios
We evaluate the feasibility of the proposed IDS on the four attack scenarios
discussed above. First, we evaluate the detection rate of different scenarios to verify
the accuracy and efficiency, and then we discuss on the tractability for the malicious
ID under different attack scenarios.
In the evaluation procedure, we test the detection rate under several circum-
stances, which is with randomly flooding injection, single message injection, and
multiple messages injection, restricted ID message injection in weak mode (WI) with
different injection frequencies (i.e., 100Hz, 50Hz, 20Hz and 10Hz). The detection
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rates averages from different frequencies for the 4 basic scenarios are summarized in
Table 2.1.
Attack scenarios Detection rate Inferring accuracy
Flood 100% —-
Single Injection 91% 97.2%
Multiple Injection 2 97% 91.8%
Multiple Injection 3 97.2% 88.5%
Multiple Injection 4 99.97% 69.7%
Weak Injection 93% 96.6%
Table 2.1: Results of detection rate and inferring accuracy from different injection
attack scenarios for the entropy-based IDS
In the flooding attack scenario, the attacker’s aim is to hamper the bus com-
munication with many faked messages. It would cause dramatic entropy changes
and thus this attack is the easiest one for detection. However, as the attacker arbi-
trary chooses the injected IDs without clear preference, it is infeasible to infer the
injected IDs based on the random changeable entropy. But if the attacker keeps
sending flooding messages with different IDs, it will be easily detected by the filter
in the gateway. Besides, it will leak some side-channel information to the internal
detection sensor of this system as it is mounted on the bus for such a long period
of time. For example, the power consumption and the requests for communication
will be distinct for this attacked ECU.
For the single message injection, the attacker injected one specific ID with
the purpose of influencing the target ECU. First of all, this injection would cause
entropy changes on the CAN bus and our intrusion system would have in average
91% rate to figure out this attack. Note this result is the average on every test
CAN IDs including those with lower injection rate. For those CAN IDs with higher
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injection rate, the detection rate could be as high as 100%. In this scenario, it
is easier to infer the malicious ID based on the entropy changes, so the inferring
accuracy is as high as 97.2%.
Then, we test and evaluate for multiple ID injections where the attacker would
inject messages with multiple IDs randomly selected from the ID pool. First, in this
scenario, messages with multiple CAN IDs are injected into the CAN bus causing
such complex changes than the single message injection. The basic approach to
detect the multiple injection messages starts with extracting the clues for inferring
the ID based on a combination of the entropy changes. To achieve the purpose, we
need to analyze not only the change direction but also the changing rate of each
bit. We modified the selected algorithm to derive new constraint for the selection.
Compared with the result in the single ID injection, the average detection rate is
higher as multiple IDs are used, which is due to the increase of the injection rate.
However, the accuracy of inferring malicious IDs decreases when having multiple
injected IDs. That is reasonable as the disturbance of multiple sources makes the
algorithm difficult to select the exact combination of malicious IDs. Moreover, the
inferring accuracy would decrease with adding more IDs which is also demonstrated
in Table 2.1. We test the multiple injection attacks with 2, 3 and 4 injected IDs
respectively and the injection rate keeps going up as we enlarge the number of IDs
while the inference accuracy goes down because of the disturbance of multiple IDs.
As we mentioned above, the multiple ID injection is restricted by the filter and in
real applications, it is challengeable for the attacker to have a fully-compromised
ECU on the CAN bus. With 4 and more injection IDs, the compromised ECU would
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be easily figured out by the gateway filter which is similar to the flood attack.
We also complete the same test on the weak adversary model, which the at-
tacker is restricted by the sender filter. Thus he can only send the messages with
the ID assigned to him. The detection result is same as the single message injection,
however, the inferring accuracy is a bit lower than the single ID injection, because
the attacker is not restricted to inject single ID on the bus, he can manipulatively
change the entropy by using multiple IDs he could legally send.
From results discussed above, we could find out that the success detection
rates are all above 90% for all the scenarios. And the inferring accuracy for several
scenarios is all above 90% as well. Moreover, with our golden entropy model, we
are able to successfully detect almost all the attacks (the 2nd column in Table 2.1)
and locate the malicious message ID except the flooding attack (the 3rd column in
Table 2.1).
2.5 Delay-based Approach
2.5.1 Framework of Delay-based Intrusion Detection System
To cope with the sophisticated attacks targeted on the in-vehicle CAN bus, we
propose a delay-based plug-in-monitor IDS which takes use of the unaltered property
of the physical topology of the CAN network. The fundamental observation from
the monitor is that each ECU outputs a characteristic signal delay difference when
monitoring on the two selected points. During the attack, the attacker would use the
attack interface different from the original ECU on the CAN bus which will cause
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the measurement of delay changing from the original observations when messages
are transmitted by the legitimate ECU. Therefore, we can identify those malicious
messages sent from the transmitter out of the expected range, thus distinguishing
the compromised ECU from the legitimate one.
2.5.1.1 The Physical Layout of the CAN bus Network
In this section, we will describe the physical layout of the CAN bus as well
as the signal transmission properties on the bus, which are relative to the delay
measurement in our set-up. As aforementioned, the electrical CAN signals fall into
two states: a dominant state (logic 0) and a recessive state (logic 1). For both
high-speed and low-speed CAN network frameworks, the transition is faster when
a recessive to dominant transition occurs since the CAN wires are being actively
driven. The speed of the dominant to recessive transition depends primarily on the
length of wire and the capacitance of the wire used.
Figure 2.6: High Speed CAN Network ISO 11898-2 with the IDS monitor
CAN is a multi-master serial bus standard for connecting ECUs also known
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as nodes. The ISO 11898-2 standard provides guidelines for the layout of high-
speed CAN network. As shown in Figure 2.6, the high speed CAN uses a linear bus
terminated at each end with 120 Ω resistors. Two or more nodes join to the linear
CAN network to communicate. The complexity of the node can range from a simple
I/O device up to an embedded computer with a CAN interface and sophisticated
software. The node may also be a gateway allowing a standard computer to com-
municate over a USB or Ethernet port to the devices on a CAN network. The linear
topology CAN network is usually used as a high speed CAN bus for automotive
applications.
The other layout of CAN bus network is regulated in the ISO 11898-3 standard
shown as Figure 2.7. It is also called low speed or fault tolerant CAN, uses a
star bus and is terminated at each node by a fraction of the overall termination
resistance. Fault tolerant CAN is often used where groups of nodes need to be
connected together forming a sub-network.
In a real vehicle, both the two types of the layout will be applied. Moreover,
the length of the bus network will be extended to 3-10 meters based on the scale
and design of the vehicle. The physical layout of ECUs will not be altered after
manufacturing, even under cyber attacks where the attacker could easily achieve
access on the bus but have no capability in changing the physical layout of the CAN
bus.
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Figure 2.7: Low Speed CAN Network ISO 11898-3 with the IDS monitor
2.5.1.2 Effects of Transmission Delay
The cause for the latency of the message transmitting on CAN bus could be
summarized as the speed of different CAN controllers and transceivers, gateway
processing delays, propagation delay of wire, propagation delay of connectors and
the clock drift or skew of the oscillators. In our work, all of the delays discussed
above will count for the final delay difference captured by the monitor.
Implementing a CAN node requires a CAN transceiver and a CAN controller
or processor with the appropriate protocol stack. In either case, the CAN controller
must be configured to reconcile the data rate and timing on the bus with the hard-
ware oscillator used for the controller. The different implementation of the CAN
node might cause observable delay differences on the CAN bus. As cable length
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increases, the high-frequency content of the signal is attenuated, so data rates are
limited for long distances. Propagation delay, which also increases with cable length,
can interfere with the synchronization and arbitration between nodes. The typical
propagation delay of a twisted pair cable for the CAN bus is 5 ns/m. Thus, for a
traditional network of length up to 50 m (the maximum length for CAN bus), the
difference in the time the transmitter drives (or releases) the bus and an observer
observes a signal transition can be up to 250 ns. Though such delays are accom-
modated within the CAN bit timing specification for a correct sampling of the bit
value, they can be exploited by the monitor to identify the transmitter. Except for
the typical propagation delay caused by the cable length, the relative bit timing dif-
ference observed by a monitor for two transmitters can be augmented by the other
delays along the transmission path as well.
The objective of our work is to fingerprint the transmitter ECU by the delay
difference from the victim ECU to the attack ECU. The two kinds of bus topology
with the IDS are shown as in Figure 2.6 for High-speed CAN and Figure 2.7 for Low-
speed CAN. We place the monitor connecting to the CAN bus network through
two wires directly attached to the bus. The monitor would watch the messages
transmitted on the bus and calculate the delay difference from his two plug-in points.
Thus, it is crucial to choose the monitor plug-in positions to enlarge the coverage of
detection for the bus system. We propose the following specific rules based on the
layouts of the CAN bus network.
1. The first rule is to maximize the delay difference of ECUs in the network in
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order to distinguish them. For the high-speed CAN network, the best position
to cover the maximum number of ECUs in supervision is at the end of the
bus network. This is naturally because if the monitor is inserted not at the
terminations, the two points will be fallen into one side of some ECUs, and the
delay difference calculated accordingly will be constant. Those ECUs would
not be covered in monitoring for this IDS. For the fault tolerant CAN network,
the best strategy is to place the two monitor points in two separated clusters
of the network as shown in Figure 2.7. If the network only has one central
cluster, the two points can be placed in any two edges of the star network.
2. The second rule is to keep the distribution distinguishable. If we place the
plug-in points much far away from the observation network, the monitor would
not tell the delay difference for the sub-network. Thus, considering the sub-
CAN network structure, we design the monitor which is responsible for a
number of 5 to 20 ECUs in the sub-network.
2.5.1.3 Electrical CAN Signal Measurement and Reprocessing
More specifically, we design the procedure of the plug-in-monitor IDS into
three phases, which are respectively the delay measurement, learning parameter
settings, and the final intrusion detection.
• Phase I : Profiling the delay differences for each ECU. The first step
is to measure the delay difference and register the legitimate ECUs based on
the measurements when the vehicle is in normal mode. The delay difference
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from the transmitter ECU to the two plug-in points would be recorded with
its ID into the system. Then, for each message ID transmitted on the bus,
the system has the location of its legal transmitters. The profiling information
will be used by the IDS to determine whether or not the message originated
from the legitimate transmitters in the following step. Phase I runs as the
initialization and registration step of IDS and will update the record of ECU
when it is necessary.
• Phase II: Exploiting the threshold of the delay differences. Based on
the data collected during the profiling stage, the IDS can build the distribution
map for each message ID with its legitimate transmitters. Further analyzing
the statistical distribution, the system will decide the threshold for each ID to
distinguish between legitimate transmitters and malicious transmitters. The
details in setting the threshold will be discussed in section 5.
• Phase III: Attack detection. For each transmitted message, only one ECU
is assigned to its transmission in most cases and the position of the ECU is
fixed unless the vehicle is broken into. Based on the timing delay difference,
the IDS could estimate the transmission range of the ECU and further decide
whether it is legitimate or not.
2.5.2 Evaluation and Experimental Results
We now evaluate the practicability and efficiency of the IDS in achieving an
accurate attacker identification on the CAN bus. At first, we will demonstrate the
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delay difference existence on the prototype of CAN bus. Then, we will show how
the IDS could identify the transmitter based on the delay difference and detect the
attack consequently.
2.5.2.1 Experiment Set-up
Our experimental setup utilizes the Arduino UNO with a seeed studio CAN
bus shield to prototype the ECU. The CAN bus shield consists of a microchip MCP
2515 CAN controller and a MCP 2551 CAN transceiver to provide the can bus
communications. The micro-controllers are connected via the standard CAN twist
pair cable with a terminal resistor.
The typical CAN architecture consists of several sub-networks of ECUs con-
nected by one or more powerful nodes that act as gateway (GW). However, for our
system, the nodes are connected in a single chain with the GW at one end. This
setup closely emulates one subnet of the network found in most modern cars. We
use another micro-controller as a monitor to probe the bus and record the delay
time for both online and offline processing.
2.5.2.2 Delay Profiling
First, we use three Arduino UNO boards to prototype the propagation delay
related to the distance. One Arduino UNO board is regarded as the master, and
other two are slaves to it. A laptop is used to monitor the CAN bus communication
and activities, so all three Arduino UNO boards are connected to the same laptop.
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Regarding the communication part, we majorly use the communication library pro-
vided by Seeed studio to achieve the message delivery in the CAN bus system. The
whole system starts by sending messages from the master with time-stamps (t1).
Then the slave who receives the message will echo a message back to the master to
confirm it already received the message. When the master receives the echo-back
message (time-stamp t2), we calculate the difference of t2 − t1 which is the delay
of the whole echo-back communication. During the time-stamp process, the timer
(16MHz) inside the Arduino is used but we add the interrupt function to improve
the time resolution. Hence, the time-stamp accuracy can be reached up to 1
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mi-
crosecond in our system. The distinguishable delay difference is shown in the Figure
2.8, we measure it at length from 0.5m, 1m, 2m, and 4m. Notice that this delay
contains the initial processing delay of the micro-controller which is estimated as
190ns in this case. The real prorogation delay should be the absolute value shown
in the figure minus the baseline delay. As the resolution for the timer of the micro-
controller is limited, we need to accumulate multiple tests in order to generate the
concrete results. The results shown in the figure are averaged by 1000 echo-back
traces.
In practice, there is enough statistical dispersion for two ECUs, as depicted
in the Figure 2.9. From this histogram, we can see the delay of two slaves (t2 − t1)
is distinguishable. Based on this, it is possible to build a mapping between the
observed characteristics and their associated IDs. And later we could classify the
messages to the transmitter ECUs based on the delay difference. We also test the
delay when the message content is modified. According to the data, the message
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Figure 2.8: Delay changes over length of the cable
with all 0 has the largest delay. The reason for this is because zero padding messages
tend to have more stuffing bits. In our future work, we will test the delay difference
between two slaves under different temperatures, and also nd which specic range is
the most distinguishable.
2.5.2.3 Attack Detection
A distance profile represents the ECU behavior of the message transmission.
The IDS would exploit every newly derived message to construct the range of mes-
sage transmitter. Although the monitor is triggered on each message and associated
with message ID, if messages originate from the same transmitter, their results are
near-equivalent. Thus, the IDS could detect the presence of malicious attackers by
monitoring the delay difference in the network, where the delay difference indicates
the location of the transmitter.
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Figure 2.9: Histogram of delay difference from Near-end ECU and Far-end ECU
In the attack experimental set-up, we continually used the delay profiling
acquired from the first stage. Specifically, we have two ECUs and one is deployed in
the far-end and the other is in the near-end. First we assign the ECU1 with ID 0x01
and ECU2 with ID 0x02. In the clean stage, they are transmitting their messages
with their assigned IDs normally. After the delay profiling procedure discussed
before, the IDS is accomplishing in collecting the difference of the delay to form the
range of transmitters for each message. Then we design the attack as the ECU1
would send with his assigned ID as normal but ECU2 would try to impersonate
ECU1 by sending messages with IDs as both 0x01 and 0x02. When the messages
are transmitted on the can bus, the IDS would refer to the profile stored and make a
comparison on the record. If the delay difference falls outside the legitimate range,
it will trigger the system an injection attack. As the monitor finds out that some
messages with ID 0x01 are not sent from the registered location, so it will trigger
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an alert to the system.
The precision, recall and the F-1 score of the tests are shown in the Table2.2.
Precision measures the percentage of true positive over the sum of true positive
and false positive. Precision gives us the clue that the proportional of real labeled
attack to some falsely diagnosed attack. While recall measure the corresponding
true positive over the sum of true positive plus false negative. The false negative of
attack alert means that the attack do exists but it is not discovered by the IDS. F-1
score is the average of precision and recall. To make a confident decision, we could
take a threshold as the mismatch rate to generate a confidential alert of the system.
Precision Recall F1-score
Benign 0.98 0.97 0.97
Attack 0.97 0.98 0.97
avg/total 0.97 0.97 0.97
Table 2.2: Results on attack detection from physical-based IDS
2.5.2.4 Detection Error Rate Analysis
The detection rate of the IDS discussed above is based on the physical layout
of the ECU testbed. Eventually, the result relies on the distance of the attack ECU
from the victim ECU. Here we will use a statistical method to analyze the detection
error rate of the IDS.
First, based on the experimental results, we figure out the delay variances obey
the Gaussian distribution as N (µ, σ2). Assume there are two ECUs on the bus, and
each would have the distribution as N (µ0, σ20), N (µ1, σ21). First, the decision is
made by the threshold th, and the delay is represented as variable d. As a result,
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the decision rule for two ECUs could be summarized as
• If d > th, then the message is sent by ECU 0
• If d < th, then the message is sent by ECU 1
Figure 2.10: An example for delay distribution and the error region
If the means are close to each other µ0 ≈ µ1, there will be an overlap of the decision
boundary as the Figure 2.10 shows, the threshold is drawn in the vertical line. The
decision boundary is used to determine the source of the message follows the rule
described above. The error region is drawn in red, based on the distribution we can
derive the error probability is
BER = Pr(b = 0)
∫ Th
−∞




We need to choose the threshold such that the error rate is minimized.
∂BER
∂Th
= 0⇒ p0(Th) = p1(Th) (2.4)
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2σ2 . If the distribution of ECUs
is identical, the best threshold line would be in the middle of the cross area. The
best case is that the two ECUs are apart to each other and there is no overlap
for densities. In phase II, the decision boundary should be chosen as the optimum
threshold and record it in the system.
2.6 Summary
More and more stealthy attacks targeted on in-vehicle network threaten the
confidentiality of the regular messages transmitting on the bus. In this chapter, we
propose two novel IDS to defend the cyber attacks on the CAN bus. The first IDS
is based on monitoring the entropy changes on the bus, which is a lightweight and
non-intrusive security framework that can protect CAN bus without modifying its
protocols and implementation. Our proposed IDS is capable of restricting attackers
from injecting a large number of malicious messages with higher priority identifiers,
as well as finding out the malicious identifiers. Further, we use the measurement of
delay difference between two monitor points when transmitting messages to finger-
print the ECUs on bus. We successfully demonstrated our proposed idea on CAN
bus prototype built on Arduino micro-controllers and CAN bus shields. This pro-
posed method only requires the installation of a monitor on the CAN bus network
without any modification of the protocol and ECU functions.
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Chapter 3: Probing Attacks on Physical Layer Key Agreement for
CAN Network
3.1 Introduction
Over the past few years, an increase in the number of connectivity interfaces
on a traditional automobile has drawn the attention of the security community.
Several high profile attacks have been demonstrated on the modern car by academic
and industrial researchers, e.g. [4, 71, 72]. These attacks are primarily facilitated by
the lack of security (authentication, encryption) in the existing architecture of the
CAN. Concurrently, several techniques have been proposed for integrating security
into the current architecture [57, 62, 73, 74].
Similar to traditional secure systems, several of these techniques rely on secure
provisioning of symmetric keys within the nodes on the CAN bus. However, secure
and robust provisioning, maintenance and update of cryptographic keys within the
automotive supply chain can incur significant overhead, and may require changes to
the automotive manufacturing and servicing facilities. Several commercial systems
to enable such a process have been proposed, e.g. in [75].
Dynamic generation and distribution of keys in a secure manner can provide
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an alternative (or reduce the functional requirements) of traditional provisioning
systems. One promising approach, Plug-and-Secure for CAN, has been recently
proposed towards this goal, in [76, 77]. A key advantage of the Plug-and-Secure
scheme is the utilization of inherent physical layer properties of the CAN bus to
provide security guarantees for key agreement between groups of nodes.
Cryptographic systems that are provably secure in the computational model
have often been compromised by exploiting characteristics of their physical imple-
mentation. Physical characteristics such as timing differences, power leakage, and
other features can provide a covert communication medium, side-channels, leaking
system information to an adversary. Several attacks have been demonstrated on tra-
ditional systems using side channels [78, 79]. Comprehensive analysis of a system to
identify and exploit such side-channels can be difficult. It has been observed from
traditional systems that prevention of such attacks can add significant overhead to
system design and negatively impact performance.
In this chapter, we demonstrate that the properties of the physical layer of
the CAN bus can be utilized to violate the security of the PnS-CAN system by
an adversary capable of probing the CAN bus. Here we discuss several voltages,
timing and transient characteristics based side-channels that can be used to attack
the system and partially extract the secret keys. We demonstrate those attacks on
CAN bus test-bed and also discuss several solutions as countermeasures for those
side channel attacks.
We investigate the side-channels for the two-party PnS-CAN protocol proposed
in [76]. Our contributions are as follows,
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1. We identify characteristics of the CAN bus that can be utilized to extract the
secret key during execution of the PnS-CAN protocol. We outline a general
methodology to map existing CAN identification techniques to attack our
scheme. We further demonstrate the attack of the system due to one of the
non-trivial feature, i.e. timing characteristics.
2. We propose countermeasures that can be included in the transceiver hardware
or the CAN controller to minimize such leakage.
3.2 System Models
3.2.1 Property of CAN bus Physical Layer
CAN bus, the primary communication network for most modern cars, is a
broadcast medium consisting of a series of nodes connected via a twisted-pair cable
with termination impedance at either end. It has two logical states, the dominant
‘0’ state, where the bus is driven by a voltage, and the recessive ‘1’ state, where the
bus is grounded. If two nodes transmit a bit simultaneously, the effective state of
the bus is ‘0’ if any of the nodes transmits the dominant bit. Thus, the bus acts as
a logical AND gate between inputs from the nodes.
The CAN bus utilizes differential signaling to transmit the data. In the CAN
standard, when transmitting the dominant bit 0 on the bus, the output pins of the
nodes, CANH and CANL, are driven to different voltage levels, and the difference
from CANH to CANL is the output of the CAN bus. Similarly, transmission of a
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recessive bit 1 occurs when CANH and CANL are not driven, and will have similar
voltage levels.
As this work focuses on attacking the PnS-CAN protocol, it inherits the sys-
tem requirements for successfully building that system, as enumerated in [77]. We
expect the typical automotive network (CAN) to be comprised of heterogeneous
nodes, i.e. nodes from different manufacturers or families. Since the PnS-CAN pro-
tocols are based on simultaneous transmission by two nodes, all write operations on
the bus during the key agreement phase use ECU pairs. Thus, the ECUs require
modified CAN controllers that allow simultaneous transmission of data during this
phase. However, during regular operation, the network operates in a CAN-compliant
manner, and hence has only single node transmitting during a frame.
3.2.2 PnS-CAN Scheme
The PnS-CAN scheme described in [76, 77], enables key agreement between
multiple nodes connected to the CAN bus. For completeness, here we present a
brief overview of the fundamental operations of the two-party key exchange scheme.
We include specific implementation aspects, that aid our attacks, in the protocol
definition. For detailed discussion about the security aspects of the original scheme,
the reader is referred to [77].
The PnS-CAN scheme between two nodes utilizes the wired AND property of
the CAN bus to mask the bits simultaneously transmitted by the nodes. The security
of this scheme is based on the inability of an eavesdropper to differentiate between
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transmissions that result in the same logical output on the bus,i.e. combinations that
result in the dominant (0) output. The operation of the basic two party protocol
between nodeN1 and nodeN2 , using random seeds r1, r2. In this, a secret bit is
generated between nodeN1 and nodeN2 when one of the nodes transmits a logical
0 (dominant bit) while the other transmits a logical 1 (recessive bit). Note that
an ideal adversary is unable to identify which of the two nodes, nodeN1 or nodeN2
transmitted the dominant bit. The group key scheme described in [77] utilizes the
PnS-TwoParty protocol between successive nodes to form a PnS chain. It was
demonstrated that pairwise interactions between consecutive ECUs are sufficient to
share the key with the group. We note that in systems, where the adversaries only
have high-level (software) access to the nodes, they can only observe the logical
output of the bus as determined by a single transceiver samples. Thus, though
perfect obfuscation of the bit values in PnS-TwoParty is theoretically possible, it
cannot be guaranteed for most practical systems where the adversaries may observe
multiple high-resolution bus samples.
3.2.3 Adversary Model for PnS-CAN
We consider an arbitrarily powerful adversary that is capable of observing
the variation of CAN bus signals with high voltage precision and timing resolution.
Such an adversary can be simply realized by an eavesdropper who accesses the wires
directly using a high precision oscilloscope. An alternate means could be through
a regular ECU connected to the CAN bus with a high precision analog-to-digital
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(A/D) converter at the input and a modified CAN controller capable of sampling
the bus at a high frequency. In a car, such nodes can be connected to the OBD-
II diagnostics port. A representation of the CAN bus with adversarial presence is
illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Representation of a typical CAN bus with 3 nodes and an eavesdropping
adversary
The goal of this work is to demonstrate the existence of side-channels. Even
though such powerful adversaries are capable of actively injecting or modifying sig-
nals, we consider the adversarial behavior to be restricted to passive observations.
However, we assume that the adversary is capable of observing the system for an
arbitrarily long time. During regular system operation, we assume that the adver-
sary is capable triggering the ECU of its choice to transmit. However, we assume
that such selective modifications cannot be made during execution of the PnS-CAN
protocol. Further, we assume that the adversary cannot control the content of the
transmissions.
Here we limit the adversarial access to a single point on the network. It should
be noted that multiple points of observation can undoubtedly increase the leakage.
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However, since in an unmodified system, a single adversary is sufficient for complete
compromise, we leave the consideration of multiple probes to future analysis. For
our attacks, we assume the location of the adversary to be carefully selected and
fixed. An adversary can theoretically improve its observations by adaptive changing
its observation point.
3.3 Attacks on PnS-CAN
To illustrate the properties that can be exploited to mount a successful attack,
consider the PnS-TwoParty system. As described before, a secret bit will be
generated when one of the nodes transmits the dominant bit 0, i.e. drives the
bus, and the other node transmits the recessive bit 1, i.e. performs no action. Even
though, in the PnS-CAN system, nodes transmit messages as full frames, for each bit
of significance (secret bit), only a single node is driving the bus. Thus identification
of the transmitting node effectively leaks the bit, as the bit is 0 if the driving node
is primary participant and 1 otherwise.
For example, consider a PnS interaction between nodeN1 and nodeN2 using the
random sequences {0, 1, 1, 0} and {1, 0, 0, 1} respectively. This results in 4 shared
secret bits, i.e. key = 0110. The bit observations on the bus corresponding to
these would comprise of 8 bits (random bits interleaved with the complement).
(b1, b2); · · · ; (b7, b8), bi = 0. Here, b1 results from nodeN1 transmitting a dominant
bit and nodeN2 a recessive bit. Thus if the adversary can identify nodeN1 as the
active node during b1, it can learn that the first secret bit is 0. Next, we describe the
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phenomenon that can be used to differentiate between various transmitters based
on physical properties of the CAN bus.
3.3.1 Experiment Set-up
Our experimental setup utilizes an FPGA (Altera Cyclone-V) based implemen-
tation of PnS-TwoParty scheme, implemented into a modified CAN controller.
The modified controller generates fully compliant CAN 2.0 frames that can be ac-
cepted by any traditional CAN controller. The test network consists of 16 nodes,
using custom designed transceiver boards that utilize the FPGA digital outputs,
connected via the standard CAN twisted pair cable.
The typical CAN architecture, consists of several sub-networks of ECUs con-
nected by one or more powerful nodes that act as gateway nodes. However, for our
system, the nodes are connected in a single chain with the GW at one end. This
setup closely emulates one subnet of the network found in most modern cars. We
use a commercial USB-CAN module to monitor the bus traffic. We use an Agilent
6012A oscilloscope to probe the bus and record the samples for offline processing.
3.3.2 Generalized Attack
Each PnS interaction occurs between two nodes in the network. As discussed
earlier, the attack on the PnS-CAN system simply reduces to identification of the
transmitting node for each individual bit of the frame. Since there are just two
nodes in each PnS-CAN round, the adversary simply needs to distinguish between
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the signals transmitted from the two nodes (binary hypothesis testing). Here, we
present a general outline of the attack methodology that the an attacker may follow.
(Data Collection) The adversary can observe the signal transmission on the bus
for a long duration prior to the attack. Note that the any CAN-compatible node
can synchronize to the transmitter and identify and sample individual bits in a
transmitted frame. Consider that the adversary samples each bit k times. We
denote these bit observations by T = x−∞, · · · , x0, where xi ∈ Xk = Rk is a vector
of samples of the bit from the bus. We assume that the system has M ECUs
connected to the bus. Thus the observations xi correspond to transmissions from
any of the M ECUs over a period of time. For traditional CAN networks, such data
is not labeled as the packets do not contain identifying information. However, an
adversary can generate labels for the data by activating known ECUs and observing
their output.
(Classifier Training) An adversary trains classification functions, DNi,Nj :X nk →
{0, 0̄}n, for each pair of labels Ni, Nj, that estimate the the sequence of transmitters
based on the input observations. We note that using {0, 0̄} represents the process of
differentiating between the transmitters, rather than identification. This represents
a larger class of classifiers, as any classifier that can correctly assign the labels, can
also differentiate between the transmitters. The adversary can train the classification
functions directly from T , using a variety of supervised or unsupervised techniques,
e.g. binary support vector machines (SVM), Long short-term memory (LSTM),
Convolutional Neural Networks [80].
For scenarios where the node does not have knowledge cannot acquire knowl-
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edge of the participating nodes or where the training data is unlabeled, the node
may train a generalized decision function D0,0̄:X nk → {0, 0̄}, that uses a classification
function preceded by a selection approach (such as maximum likelihood based esti-
mator) select the best function. Clearly, the performance of a generalized classifier
is sub optimal compared to the classifier for a particular pair of nodes. Thus an
adversary, without priory knowledge of the transmitters has a significant disadvan-
tage.
(PnS-CAN compromise) During PnS-CAN operation, for an adversary to extract
the key, it does not require perfect identification of the node identity. Since the PnS
system involves just two ECUs at any time, its task is to simply distinguish between
the transmissions from the two participating ECUs. Consider the scenario where two
nodes Ni, Nj execute the PnS protocol to produce n bits. The adversary observes the
k sample values for each of the n bits as xi = {s1(i), s2(i), ..., sk(i)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
uses the classifier DNi,Nj (or general classifier in scenarios where Ni, Nj is unknown)
and obtains a sequence of estimates (T̂1, T̂2, · · · T̂n) ∈ {0, 0̄}n.
For PnS-CAN, classification without correct labeling of the nodes still reveals
the complete secret (or its inverse). Thus the disadvantage of the weaker adversary
is simply 1 bit of entropy, which is insignificant and results in violation of system
security. We note that methods from CAN identification literature, e.g. from [67,
68, 81, 82], can be directly mapped to this generalized outline to attack the PnS-
CAN scheme. However, the accuracy may be lower since the identification is for a
single bit rather than a group of bits (frame).
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3.3.3 Attack Procedure
The detailed attack is be described as Attack PnS-TwoParty. We utilized this
to identify the secret key for 12 pairs of nodes in our setup. With minor modification
of the threshold parameters between different iterations, we were able to successfully
identify all the secret bits exchanged between each pair.
Attack: PnS-TwoParty
1. The adversary synchronizes to the first 1 to 0 transition, i.e. start of frame
bit (SOF). The transmitting node is the referred to as the primary node.
2. The adversary utilizes the first 19 bits of the header to estimate the expected
variation parameters of transition times (µp, σp).
Start of the PnS data frame
3. If the bit value has changed, compute the transition time. Compute the bit
triggering the transition by comparing the transition time to a threshold τ ,
where τ is a function of (µp, σp).
4. If bit value has not changed,
(a) If this is corresponding to the first bit (non-inverted), then the possible
transitions are 0 − 0 → 0 − 1, 0 − 1 → 1 − 0, 0 − 0 → 1 − 0, and vice
versa. If the current voltage level is higher than the previous bit ((b) in
Figure 3.2), both nodes transmitted a dominant value for the current bit.
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Otherwise, if the level decreases, nodes transitioned to a 0 − 1 or 1 − 0
configuration. Utilize the next bit to compute the current value.
(b) If this is corresponding to the second bit, it could have only resulted from
a 0− 1→ 1− 0 transition or vice versa. If a dip is detected at the start
of the frame ((a) in Figure 3.2), the primary node was transmitting a
dominant bit in the previous frame. Otherwise, if an increase is detected
((c) in Figure 3.2), the secondary node was transmitting the 0.
Soft synchronization
5. If the secondary node ever triggers a recessive to dominant transition, re-
synchronize to the secondary node and switch the roles of the primary and
secondary nodes. This is depicted by (r) in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Snapshot of bus observations for PnS-CAN protocol
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3.3.4 Observations on Physical Layer of CAN Bus
Similar to other electrical systems, in an automotive network will have dif-
ferences in characteristics of the driver and network between an observer and the
transmitters. We illustrate 3 phenomena that can be utilized to differentiate be-
tween bits transmitted by different nodes. One of the advantages of using differential
signaling for CAN transmissions, is that it enables devices with varying electrical
characteristics to be utilized on the same bus without any additional compensation
circuitry. While this improves the design and robustness of the bus, the different
characteristics also enables identification of the transmitter, leading to leakage of
the bits. For a transmitted bit, differences in steady state characteristics can be
attributed to several factors.
3.3.4.1 Difference in Driver Circuits
Transceivers from different manufacturers (or even different models of the same
manufacturer) can have different drive characteristics and output voltage range of
the CANH and CANL pins. This can be due to different circuits, components or
load impedance. Thus an adversary measuring the absolute voltage on CANH and
CANL lines with respect to a common ground reference can distinguish between the
dominant transmissions from different nodes.
For example, consider a realization of the CAN network using Microchip
(MCP2551) for nodeN1 and NXP (TJA1040) for nodeN2 . The ideal specified range
for the CANH pin for MCP2551 is between 2.75V and 4.5V , while the same range
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Figure 3.3: Observations for scenario of 2 nodes, A:MCP2551, B:TJA1040
for TJA1040 is between 3V and 4.25V . In Figure 3.3, we illustrate the voltage
observations of the adversary for a sequence of bits corresponding to the generation
of a secret bit in the PnS-CAN protocol, i.e. transition from a 0-1 scenario to a 1-0
scenario. The adversary can clearly distinguish between the dominant transmission
by nodeN1 and nodeN2.
3.3.4.2 Different Operating Voltages
The differential signaling of the CAN bus allows interoperability of nodes with
different supply voltage, without scaling circuits. For example, typical automotive
networks contain ECUs with both 5V and 3.3V operating voltage. Though these
nodes have similar differential voltage between the CANH and CANL lines, the
absolute voltage level on each line, during bit transmission, is different. An adversary
can utilize this identify the node transmitting the dominant bit during PnS-CAN.
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3.3.4.3 Different Physical Locations
Even nodes with identical drivers and operating voltages can seem different
from the view of an intermediate observer in the network. This is due to the differ-
ences in the effective impedance of the network segment between the two transceivers
and the observer point. For a typical CAN bus scenario, several factors can con-
tribute to these differences, e.g. different length of wires between the nodes and the
observer, or different number of intermediate nodes. In Figure 3.4, we illustrate the
differential voltage of two nodes at varying distances (over 1m difference) from the
observer. In a typical CAN network, the difference in distance can be over 30m.
Though this difference appears small in comparison to other phenomenon, it can be
useful in many scenarios.
Figure 3.4: Observations of two identical transmitters located at different distances
from the adversary
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3.3.5 Evaluation and Experimental Results
We demonstrate an attack on the PnS-CAN scheme using the characteristics
described before. We utilize the oscilloscope to obtain samples of the differential bus
voltage at 125Msamp/s. The transitions are identified by as points of large change
in bus voltage (greater than the CAN trigger) followed by a steady state over at
least half the bit width. We utilize the 50% point of the transition to compute the
rise time, fall time and latency.
Node Delay (ns) Node Delay (ns)
ID Min Max Mean Std ID Min Max Mean Std
1 138 166 151.8 12.6 9 118 154 135.2 15.7
2 140 168 153.4 12.5 10 118 154 135.0 15.3
3 140 168 153.8 12.6 11 122 156 139.1 14.7
4 140 172 156.2 12.9 12 124 158 140.9 14.6
5 130 162 144.4 14.2 13 116 146 130.6 12.6
6 130 160 144.8 14.0 14 118 146 131.2 12.3
7 132 164 147.1 13.7 15 118 152 135.4 14.8
8 136 164 148.7 12.4 16 122 154 137.2 13.3
Table 3.1: Signal delays between nodes and observer
First, we investigate the separability of the nodes by measuring the propa-
gation delays of the nodes synced with respect to the observation point. In Table
3.1, we enumerate the propagation delays from each node. Intuitively, nodes that
have similar propagation delay would be difficult to differentiate (in the perfectly
synchronized scenario). Further, in Table 3.2, we enumerate combinations of nodes
have the least (and maximum) overlap. Such nodes pairs correspond to the nodes
with the largest (and smallest) adversarial advantage.
In Figure 3.2, we illustrate a snapshot of the CAN protocol between two nodes
as observed by an adversary. Intuitively, the attack exploits the difference in propa-
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Table 3.2: Maximum and minimum overlaps of propagation delay
gation delays by synchronizing to one of the transceivers and estimating the trans-
mitter based on the rise and fall time offset. There are two key features of the
PnS-CAN implementation that aid our analysis.
1. The initiating node transmits the PnS header and the secondary node synchro-
nizes to the initiating node. Since only a single node is transmitting during the
header phase, it is easy to estimate the timing variation for the synchronous
bits.
2. As described before, the random bits are interleaved with the inverted bits.
This introduces dependence in successive transmissions as it enables only cer-
tain transitions during the PnS phase. This can be utilized to estimate the
bits in some cases. The detailed attack is be described as Attack PnS-
TwoParty. We utilized this to identify the secret key for 12 pairs of nodes
in our setup. With minor modification of the threshold parameters between
different iterations, we were able to successfully identify all the secret bits
exchanged between each pair.
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3.4 Countermeasures for PnS-CAN
As discussed, the PnS-CAN module is susceptible to a range of characteriza-
tion attacks due to consistency of the features of the physical signals from individual
nodes. While this is good for robustness of the system, the CAN standard allows
for significant variation of these properties. Thus, intuitively, we design the coun-
termeasures to add controlled noise to the physical signals, such that signals from
different nodes are indistinguishable for an adversary. The goal of the noise addition
is to minimize the adversarial advantage between nodes.
Here, we propose mitigation at different levels of abstractions, namely the
transceiver hardware level, CAN controller level and the system level. At the hard-
ware and controller level, the goal is to minimize the adversarial advantage between
all ECUs either by adding noise or improving cooperation between the nodes. At the
system level, the goal is to minimize adversarial advantage by restricting interaction
between highly identifiable nodes. It should be noted that the performance of the
countermeasures proposed here is highly dependent on the CAN properties. Thus,
they are proposed with the goal of minimizing the leakage, rather than provably
eliminating it. We leave as an open problem, the design of countermeasures that
can formally shown to be effective against the adversaries treated here.
The voltage observed by an adversary is a function of strength of the current
source and impedance of the network between the observer and the current source.
For a non-uniform network, this directly relates to the physical positions of source
and the observer. To prevent identification by the adversary, voltage can be varied
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for each transmission of the dominant bit by using a random number of current
sources, located at different points in the network.
Our experimental results demonstrate that the observations at a single point
due to dominant bits from multiple transceivers is different. Such a phenomenon
can also be observed in box (c) of Figure 3.2. In Table 3.3, we enumerate the
output at the observer due to simultaneous transmissions from different transceivers
connected to the bus. For increased variations, we performed experiments using
3 different transceiver families, i.e. nodeN1 (MCP2551), nodeN2 (TJA1040) and
nodeN3 (TJA1041).
nodeN1 nodeN2 nodeN3 Vout
0 0 0 2.4230
0 0 1 2.1281
0 1 0 2.1197
0 1 1 1.8208
1 0 0 2.3400
1 0 1 1.7710
1 1 0 1.7629
1 1 1 0.0000
Table 3.3: Vout for dominant tx by multiple nodes
Similar to variation in sources, adding a random number of sink nodes may
vary the observation by an adversary. In the regular setting, each node on the
bus that is not transmitting acts as a sink. Thus, we can vary the number of
sinks on the bus by adding the capability of electrical isolation of non-participating
nodes. Thus any transceiver with such a capability can be in 3 distinct modes,
i.e. transmitting a dominant signal, transmitting a recessive bit (or just passive),
or electrically isolated. In Table 3.4, we outline the voltage observations of the
adversary for different states of the tristate nodes. The ‘X’ denotes a transceiver
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that is electrically isolated. Ideally, with N transceivers, we can obtain 3N − 2N
different voltage levels. The variation of voltage levels with a bit can decrease the
probability of its identification. We outline a few architectures to utilize this feature
to prevent adversarial information leakage.
nodeN1 nodeN2 nodeN3 Vout
X 0 0 2.5842
X 0 1 2.1174
X 1 0 2.0923
0 0 X 2.3159
0 1 X 1.9647
1 0 X 2.1493
0 X 0 2.2957
0 X 1 1.9599
1 X 0 2.1415
Table 3.4: Vout for dominant tx by multiple nodes with isolation
3.5 Summary
While the PnS-CAN scheme is a promising mechanism for generating group
keys, it is highly susceptible to probing attacks by even simple adversaries. We
presented a general methodology for attacking the system and demonstrated a simple
timing based attack. We discussed several sources of physical identifiers that can
be used by an adversary. We proposed several mechanisms to mask these identifiers
at the hardware, CAN controller and system level. This work serves as a proof-of-
concept for the existence of attacks on the PnS-CAN schemes and the the ability of
the system designer to prevent them.
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Chapter 4: GPS Spoofing Detection Methods on the Edge
4.1 Introduction
Nowadays, most of the modern automobiles are equipped with GPS module
to assist location relative functions such as smart navigation, emergency assistance,
and traffic information service. With the rapid developments of autonomous driv-
ing, the algorithms for self-driving rely on the GPS system as a critical fallback to
ensure accurate timing and location. Moreover, as more and more vehicles becoming
connected to join the VANETs in assistance of driving, GPS signals have also been
widely applied in VANETs for precise positioning, message time stamping as well as
other real-time network applications [56, 59]. However, from the security perspec-
tive, the civilian GPS signals are very vulnerable to outside attackers because they
are not encrypted and can easily be spoofed [83]. The GPS spoofing attack could
deceive a receiver by broadcasting counterfeit GPS signals that are stronger than
the real GPS signals. The same kind of GPS spoofing attacks could also take place
on vehicles and this kind of spoofing attacks will cause severe risks on the vehicles
because the locations of vehicles are critical and supposed to be reliable and integral
for the navigation systems. The situation would become more severe for this attack
on the self-driving vehicles because the safety or security-critical decisions and pro-
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cesses of autonomous driving highly rely on the sensor data including the position
data from the GPS.
Once the GPS signal gets spoofed, the central control system for navigation
would be the first to be misled by the malicious attackers. The urgent task for
the reliability of the navigation system is to detect the spoofing attacks as soon
as possible after the attack took place. There have been several authentications
and anti-spoofing techniques for this propose. One of the straightforward meth-
ods is to use multiple receivers, i.e, the antennas to cross-check the signal [84, 85].
When adding multiple receivers to check the incoming signals, the slight changes
introduced by the spoofed source could be captured by the out of receivers. How-
ever, sophisticated attackers could replicate the spoofed signal with phase-aligned
to two and more GPS receivers. These sophisticated spoofing attacks are hard to
be detected by multi-receivers because it synthesizes spoofing signals for multiple
satellites in a way that initially overlays them on top of the true signals. The other
methods to detect GPS spoofing leverage on the analysis of the signals as a time
of arrival or received strength [86]. While these detection methods would require
equipment to capture the characteristics of the signals and may not be flexible on a
vehicular system.
Since data is increasingly produced and generated at the edge of the network,
it becomes natural to consider processing the data at the edge. Under this cir-
cumstance, edge computing is proposed to be an efficient method to support lots of
applications. With the push from the edge computing, our proposed GPS validation
could be applied at the edge of the network, i.e, the vehicle. Besides, edge comput-
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ing is also believed to have the potential to address the concerns of data safety and
privacy.
Driven by the increasing threat and the lack of realistic short-term solutions,
we develop a low-cost validation mechanism for detecting GPS spoofing attacks on
vehicles based on the driving information acquired through the in-vehicle CAN bus.
Our proposed method relies on the key insight that the data from the inner vehi-
cle network are trusted and demonstrated by the in-vehicle authentication methods
[16, 21, 23, 69]. Unlike previous attempts to secure GPS, our proposed method nei-
ther requires any updates of the GPS infrastructure nor of the vehicle’s receivers. In
contrast, our proposed mechanism would detect the spoofing attacks by reconstruct-
ing the GPS position from continuously analyzes the information recorded on the
CAN bus, such as the vehicle speed and the steering angle. Moreover, we proposed
this cross-check GPS spoofing detection method as a paradigm of edge computing,
since all the computations are processed at the edge of the network.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
1. A low-cost method on the edge
Compared to several other approaches proposed to detect the spoofing attacks
such as the cross-correlation of encrypted signals [84], calibration with multi-
ple antennas [87] and the methods rely on inertial high-stability clocks [86],
our cross-validation method has significant advantages on the cost. First, our
method does not require any extra devices such as the additional antenna or
receiver which might be too heavy to carry on and not practical in vehicles.
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Second, our method focuses on the plain GPS signals and does not need any
encryptions and decryptions on the GPS signals. Therefore, our method could
avoid aligning with military signals for civilian vehicles which may arouse per-
mission issues on the commercial vehicles. That is because the United States
GPS also includes the military signals that have encrypted on the spreading
codes and the legacy code. And those codes can be predicted only with a
secret encryption key. Spreading the secret key to civilian vehicles is not ap-
plicable. At last, to solve the bottleneck as data transportation through the
VANETs, our detection method would take place at the edge side (i.e., the
vehicle) and take use of the already deployed micro-controllers in the vehicle.
Those controllers have comparable computing power to process the data from
numerous sensors and fulfill the GPS spoofing detection.
2. Trust and Privacy are validated by the in-vehicle network
Some methods for positioning rely on the collaboration of the neighbor vehicles
in the network, thus arouse the problem of privacy risk for the locations [88].
First, the assisting car might not want to share position to the lost car due to
the privacy consideration. Moreover, the assisting car might misbehave to fake
false signals to cheat the lost car. Those aroused problems might be solving
by the proposed privacy-preserving location, however, need much more efforts
to set-up the communications, which will inevitably add influential delays
to the system [89]. However, our proposed method uses the local on-board
signal which does not need any extra communications from the outside of
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vehicles. Moreover, the signals collected on board are proved by the in-vehicle
authentication communications which are believed to be trusted without any
interference by the third-parties [90]. Besides, since the data are collected
and processed on the edge side, the privacy of the vehicle and the driving
information could be guaranteed as the interactions to the cloud vulnerabilities
are cut-off.
3. Applicable on autonomous vehicles
As cars become increasingly autonomous, and self-driving vehicles move from
the test markets to the main streets, security will become the primary challenge
for automakers. The more connected a vehicle is, the more susceptible it
becomes to potentially deadly cyber attacks. Our proposed cross-validate
method could be applied to autonomous vehicles with trivial efforts. Besides,
autonomous cars take use of a variety of sensors to perceive their surroundings,
including radar, laser light, GPS and computer vision modules, which could
provide our system with rich sensory data as free of charge.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 GPS Signal and Spoofing
GPS is the world’s premier Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), con-
sisting of 31 satellites launched by the U.S. military and made available for civilian
and commercial use as well. GPS-capable receivers can determine their position
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and time by picking up time-stamped signal data from a minimum of four overhead
satellites. By using the time stamps to calculate the time of arrival, a receiver can
calculate a triangulated position. The time of arrival measurements are affected by
a range of errors resulting in typical localization uncertainty of σ = 4m (mean error
is about 7m) [91]. Ordinarily, GPS is believed to be precise and reliable, so that
lots of geographic positioning systems including the navigation system for vehicles
are dependent on GPS signals. However, problems and attacks with this system
have become increasingly evident. The reason is that civilian GPS signal is un-
encrypted, and it has no proof-of-origin or authentication features, so the system
remains extremely susceptible to fraud, spoofing, jamming, and cyberattack. As a
result, civilian (public) GPS signals can be decoded by everyone, including airplanes,
vehicles, ships and the other systems required location services. Attacks on the GPS
signal are usually performed by an adversary by either jamming or spoofing one or
both radio channels. For the jamming attack, an adversary transmits overwhelming
radio interference over the band. For spoofing attacks, the adversary mimics the
legitimate signals by intentionally alter data received by a victim receiver with the
purpose of modifying the localization or time result of the victim. Since civilian GPS
signals are not encrypted and the structure of the signal is well known, spoofing at-
tacks are relatively straightforward to execute using a commercial signal generator
and RF transmitter. Over the years, the price to perform GPS spoofing attacks
has dramatically dropped. Nowadays, mobile commercial GPS spoofing devices are
available for less than $1000 with publicly software tools installed which enables any
parties to generate faked GPS signals.
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To tackle down those spoofing attacks on GPS, several authentication and
anti-spoofing techniques for GNSS signals have been developed in recent years.
These techniques can be broadly categorized as signal and data-level authentica-
tion. For signal authentication, received signal characteristics of the civilian signal
may be verified against encrypted GPS transmissions. Additionally, the plane-of-
polarization and angle-of-arrival can be measured to validate the signal as well.
Paper [92] proposed to justify the directional characteristics and polarization of the
received signal. The strength of a received GPS signal is typically less than -150
dBW and presence of substantially stronger signals for a single satellite or over the
entire frequency band can be a sign of attack in progress. However, it is possi-
ble for a spoofing attacker to adjust power levels to evade detection limiting the
usefulness of the threshold detection mechanism in practice [92]. Similarity, using
directional characteristics of the receiver antenna to cross-validate received signals
from each satellite requires specialized phase tracking hardware to detect directional
variations. Similarly, signal polarization characteristics have been shown to be an
effective authentication aid [93]. However, dedicated receiver front ends and signal
processing is required to implement the approach efficiently.
Data-level spoofing detection uses demodulated GPS data to detect spoofing.
GPS data can be validated with known position data or otherwise obtained time to
detect attacks [94]. For example, a stationary receiver can check its known position
with the position-solution of the receiver. Since trilateration position error can
be 10 meters, the position solution is a weak measure of credibility. It has been
recently demonstrated by Jiang et al. [95] that attackers can use this uncertainty
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to induce a phase angle error of 52 degrees in a Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU)
receiver by using simple optimization based evasion algorithms. Data-level spoofing
detection methods can also be applied with assistance by cryptographic techniques
[96]. Those methods propose to authenticate signals from satellites with additional
signals encrypted by the secret key. However, these techniques are not resistant to
replay attacks and would require a costly upgrade of the GPS infrastructure.
Monitoring jumps in the time reported by the GPS signals is another pos-
sible GPS spoofing countermeasure. One can deploy accurate clocks to measure
time deviation between the reported GPS clock and the onboard clock. However,
precise clocks (such as atomic clocks etc.) are expensive and not used in practice
for commercial purposes. For IoT components, one can also compare the GPS time
with networked time protocols such as Network Time Protocol (NTP). However, the
approach can suffer when the network is down. Moreover, the resolution of attack
detection is limited by the accuracy of the networked clocks.
4.2.2 GPS Usage in Vehicles
Nowadays, each vehicle of the VANETs is required to be equipped with a po-
sitioning system (receiver) to achieve the applications in communication and data
sharing [1]. GPS is typically used by the vehicle or the driver for self-localization and
navigation but the technology is also used for remote traffic surveillance and collision
avoidance on the VANETs. In the latter use-cases, vehicles are required to periodi-
cally broadcast position and velocity to inform the neighboring vehicles and the road
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assistant controllers through the VANETs. VANETs can achieve effective communi-
cation between moving node by using different ad-hoc networking short-range radio
technologies such as Wifi IEEE 802.11 b/g, WiMAX IEEE 802.10, Bluetooth, IRA.
Irrespective of any transmission interfaces used, these transmitted messages contain
a position that is directly derived from the on-vehicle GPS receivers. Although the
GPS receiver has widely been used for conventional automotive applications, it does
not guarantee reliability and continuity of position data.
The major goal of spoofing attacks on an automobile GPS system is to produce
erroneous position signals to fool the navigation systems. The vehicles under attack
may result in deviate to wrong places or loss of GPS signals. Since the GPS signals
used by vehicles are not encrypted, an attacker can easily spoof the RF antenna
input of a GPS receiver using a signal generator and RF transmitter. Consequently,
the on-road vehicles are vulnerable to GPS spoofing attacks, where an attacker
transmits fake signals that imitate signals from satellites but higher power and at
different time delays. The false signal is designed to cause the GPS receiver to report
an incorrect position solution. As vehicles become more autonomous, robust GPS
positioning will be an invaluable resource if threats like spoofing can be successfully
abated. Since many of the functions and applications in VANETs are dependent
on the civilian GPS signals to locate and synchronize in the network, successful
GPS spoofing attack can facilitate other cyber attacks as well (i.e., Sybil attack on
VANETs).
Some methods of spoofing detection on vehicles have been proposed which
concentrate on the raw signal observations like signal power and clock offsets in
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identifying an attack. Since receiver spoofing detection methods to be able to detect
some attacks, but most sophisticated spoofing techniques are extremely difficult to
be detected without external information. An inertial measurement may assist in
calibrating the GPS signals using filters benefit [87]. Even though these detection
approaches do not require changes to the GPS infrastructure, they still have a
crucial drawback. They assume more specialized GPS receivers increasing, e.g., the
complexity and power requirements. The major problem is that it is urgent to find
a low-cost GPS spoofing detection method without disclosing the privacy of the
vehicle. In paper [89], the author proposed a spoofing detection and mitigation
system relies on an existing cooperative adaptive cruise control system to provide
inter-vehicle ranging and data sharing. However, this work takes use of the cruise
control system and requires multiple vehicles to collaborate on the detection.
Instead of threats from spoofing attacks, lost of GPS signal can also cause
malfunctions of the navigation system. GPS receiver depends on weak satellite
signals from about 22000 km away in space, which is very easy to interfere with
the other signals. Besides, The GPS requires at least four beacon signals to be
overhead and the urban density and skyscrapers also cause difficulties in receiving
four messages and the issue of multi-path signals occurs within the vicinity of high
rise buildings. Further, the mobility of the vehicles makes it even worse to receive
precise and continuous GPS signals. As a result, some vehicles may occur temporary
loss of GPS signals due to the cover of the terrains.
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4.2.3 Edge Computing
The development of IoT and the success of cloud services have pushed the
horizon of a new computing paradigm, edge computing, which calls for processing
the data at the edge of the network [97]. Now with the arrival in the edge computing
era, where there will be a large quality of data generated by the end devices, and
a lot of applications will also be deployed at the edge to consume these data [98].
Some applications would require very short response time, some may involve private
data, and some might produce a large quantity of data which could be a heavy load
for network communications. Under those circumstances, cloud computing is not
always efficient enough to support these applications. As a result, edge computing
is believed to have the potential to meet the requirements as the response time
requirement, battery life constraint, bandwidth cost saving, as well as data safety
and privacy [99].
In summary, there are mainly two reasons for the growing demand on the edge
computing. First and foremost, since data is increasingly produced at the edge of the
network, it would be more efficient to process and filter the data at the edge where
also allocated enough computing power nowadays. The rationale of edge computing
is that computing should happen at the proximity of data sources. Here we define
“edge” as any computing and network resources along the path between data sources
and cloud data centers. In our application, a smart vehicle is an edge between the
vehicle sensors and the network cloud (i.e., VANETs). Modern vehicles are usually
equipped with 50-100 micro-controllers to process the maneuvers of vehicles. One of
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the main function of those controllers is to process the data generated or collected
by the sensors. Those controllers have the comparable computing power to process
the data at the edge which generate the “decision” from the numerous sensor data.
That is why the edge computing paradigm worked on modern vehicles.
Secondly, with the growing quantity of data generated at the edge, speed of
data transportation is becoming the critical bottleneck for the cloud-based comput-
ing paradigm. For example, about 5 Gigabyte data will be generated by a Boeing
787 every second, but the bandwidth between the airplane and either satellite or
base station on the ground is not large enough for data transmission. Consider an
autonomous vehicle as another example. One Gigabyte data will be generated by
the car every second and it requires real-time processing for the vehicle to make
correct decisions. If all the data needs to be sent to the cloud for processing, the re-
sponse time would be too long [72]. Not to mention that current network bandwidth
and reliability would be challenged for its capability of supporting a large number
of vehicles in one area. In this case, the data needs to be processed at the edge
for shorter response time, more efficient processing and smaller network pressure.
As an example, cameras in an autonomous vehicle capture a huge amount of video
data, which the system must process in real time to yield good driving decisions.
If the vehicle must send the data to the cloud for processing, the response time
would be too long. And a large number of autonomous vehicles in one area would
further strain network bandwidth and reliability. Processing data at the network










Figure 4.1: Edge computing paradigm for connected vehicles
In the cloud computing paradigm, the end devices at the edge usually play
as a data consumer. As the example shown in Figure 4.1, the end vehicle usually
receive the GPS signal from the cloud which is either the satellite network or the
central VANETs facilities [100]. Nowadays, smart vehicles deployed with multiple
sensors can also produce data. The change from a data consumer to data pro-
ducer/consumer requires more function placement at the edge. For example, it is
very normal for the vehicle to report the location or share traffic data through a
cloud service every single minute. However, the volume of data could be fairly large
and it would occupy a lot of bandwidth for uploading. In this case, there is a possi-
bility that the data could be processed or calculated adjusted to suitable resolution
at the edge before uploading to the cloud network. Another benefit from edge com-
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puting is privacy preserving. Since the physical data collected by the things at the
edge of the network is usually private, processing the data at the edge could protect
user privacy better than uploading raw data to cloud [101].
4.3 Threat Model in GPS Spoofing
In the past, incidents were reported where spoofs successfully interfered with
the integrity of the GPS system on vehicles. Based on common assumptions on the
attacker’s capabilities, we assess the threat model in this section. First, we clarify
our considered adversary model. Second, we reason about key assumptions that our
proposed GPS spoofing detectors.
4.3.1 Threat Model
The motivation of the attacker is to interfere the vehicle safety by injecting
false positioning information into the GPS system. An attacker may first want to
stop the navigation system or the other position based function of the vehicle to
hinder the vehicle’s system. He can achieve to divert the vehicle to somewhere else
without notice by the vehicle. Moreover, the attacker can destroy VANETs commu-
nication by manipulating the GPS signal of the victim vehicle. For those VANETs
protocols which use the position as authentication proofs, the victim vehicle will
result in failure to prove the location, thus cannot get any service or partition into
the VANETs.
In our adversary model, the attacker is able to use specially crafted signals
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with a higher power to the victim receiver. The attacker aims at spoofing a moving
vehicle from a position on the ground. Since the availability and cost of the GPS
transponders, we decide to use the simulation for GPS spoofing validation in this
chapter of dissertation. We assume the GPS spoof changed the receiver’s signal by
using higher power at the target location, thus resulting in changing the decoded
GPS signal. Here, we assume the attacker’s aim is to divert the vehicle to the other
location, so he will continuously inject false GPS signals into the navigation system.
4.3.2 Validation of Assumptions
Our proposed method relies on two key assumptions which we validate in this
section. First and foremost, the vehicle would know correct start GPS location when
the vehicle’s engine starts. We assume this would be achieved by other mechanism
such as cryptographic location authentication but cannot be authenticated with
high frequency. While this is considered as one-time per journey authentication,
it would not engage too much cost in communication and calculation. The second
assumption is that the spoofing attacker will only affect the GPS signal but has
no capability in changing the other signals in the vehicle, i.e, the vehicle speed or
the steering wheel angle. The confidential of those signals are guaranteed by the
in-vehicle security mechanism. We validate these two assumptions with controlled
lab experiments and simulations with real-world vehicle data.
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4.4 Reconstruction of GPS Signals on the Edge
We propose a mechanism to cross-validate the GPS signals received by the au-
tomobiles with an edge computing process on the trusted data from the in-vehicle
network. Our proposed mechanism would serve as an independent system infras-
tructure on the vehicle which continuously analyzes the contents generated through
the vehicle behaviors. Furthermore, our proposed method could also be applied
in predicting the location of the vehicle when the on-board GPS signal is unavail-
able. The data used in the GPS spoofing detection system are mainly from the vast
majority of sensors installed and operated on the modern vehicles, especially the
autonomous vehicles, are equipped with a variety of sensors for driving assistance.
Rich information such as vehicle speeds, locations, and time stamps are commonly
recorded by the central control system of the vehicle. It is almost no cost by using
the existing rich data from the in-vehicle sensors. As a result, our proposed method
is considered to be a lightweight method to detect GPS spoofing. We proposed
to apply our two developed algorithms to realize the purpose on the vehicle, the
computing edge, which would save the communication times and overload. Also, we
use downloaded map information to further improve the accuracy on reconstruction
GPS signals, which is also operated on the edge side.
As discussed previously, detecting GPS spoofing attacks with extra hardware
extensions is of high-cost and not feasible for vehicles. It is obviously unnecessary
to find a place to install extra antennas or receivers in a compact vehicle.
101
4.4.1 Method I: Non-holonomic Car-like Robot Demo (Kinematic
Model)
As previously stated, the main aim of the attacker is to trick the GPS receiver
into reporting an inaccurate position without identifying the failure. To defeat
the attacker’s purpose, the first proposed spoofing detection approach leverages the
driving information data and the physical model of vehicle to reconstruct the loca-
tion information. Specifically, the method takes use of the non-holonomic kinematic
model to calculate the trajectory of the vehicle and reports the spoofing attacks if
any inconsistencies found.
Figure 4.2: Generalized Coordinates of a car-like robot
The movements of the vehicle can be modeled by the kinematic equations of
a car-like robot [102]. The kinematic model is derived from the physical feature of
a mobile wheel with the presence of non-holonomic constraints due to the rolling
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without slipping condition between the wheels and the ground. The symbol of the
kinematic model of vehicle is shown in Figure 4.2. For simplicity, we assume that
two wheels on each axle collapse into a single wheel located at the mid-point of the
axle. For a front-drive vehicle, we assume that the front wheel can be steered while
the rear wheel orientation is fixed. The generalized coordinates are q = (x, y, θ, φ),
where x and y are Cartesian coordinates of the rear wheel, θ measure the orientation
of the car body with respect to the x axis and φ is the steering angle. The derived






















Where v1 is the driving velocity refers to the front wheel and v2 is the steering
velocity input.
Note that the input v2 in the dynamics is the angular velocity of the wheel,
however, our dataset does not provide this measurement. But the dataset has
recorded the steering wheel angle status with time stamps which could be used
to calculate the steering velocity. Specifically, the steering wheel angle is recorded
in degree and the range apart from the normal reference is from -900 degrees to 900
degrees. Based on the mechanical structure of the vehicle, the turning of the steering
is proportional to the actual turning of the wheels. Based on vehicle manufacture
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books, the ratio is varying among different models and it usually falls in between 12:1
to 24:1. Thus, to calculate the dynamics of the vehicle with the steering velocity,
we should derive the appropriate steering ratio of the test vehicle. For example,
the steering ratio is r and the turning of the steering wheel is Φ, the actual change
of the wheel would be φ = Φ/r. And the angle velocity discussed above can be
modeled as v2 =
dφ
dt
. The other input of the dynamic functions v1 could be acquired
directly from the dataset. Each state of vehicle is represented as q = (x, y, θ, φ) and
the coordinates of the position are calculated by the inputs and the transit state of
the function. Based on all the transit states derived from the dynamics equation,
the transitory of the vehicle is achieved.
In the kinematic model discussed above, we make approximations when simu-
lating the dynamics of the model. For example, we treat the two wheels as a single
axis in the middle but a practical model should also consider the rotation angles of
each wheel as generalized coordinates. Furthermore, an accurate model should also
account for the presence of actuators and sensors on the wheel axis as well as for
typical non-ideal such as tire deformation. For example, at higher speeds or with
sharp steering, the no-wheel-slip assumption breaks down due to the lateral force.
Besides, the above system is assumed to be drift less, i.e, no motion takes place
under zero input that there are fewer control inputs than generalized coordinates.
But the real road test would be totally different and it is not trivial to establish a
complicated mathematical model for the real road condition. Moreover, some pa-
rameters to model the dynamics of the vehicle is confidential of the manufacture and
not disclosed to the public. As a result, we choose to use a simple one. However,
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we shall admit the existence of errors when using an approximate model.
4.4.2 Method II: Regression Model
As an alternative to mitigate the error generates by approximate modeling,
we derive a regressive algorithm to describe the relationship of the steering wheel
angle and heading of the vehicle. More specifically, we calculate the next coordinates
based on the current location, current velocity, and the steering-wheel angle. For
example, we calculate the next coordinate based on the length of the route (l) and
the heading angle (θ) from the previous coordinate. The length of routes can be
achieved easily by assuming uniform motion in a small period of time, i.e, l = v · t,
where v is the sampled velocity of this period and t stands for the time interval.
Thus, we could acquire the changes on the coordinated from the following equations,

∆x = l cos θh
∆y = l sin θh
(4.2)
with δx represents the changes from the X coordinate and δy denotes the changes
on the Y coordinate. Since the distance l is calculated by the speed and time, the
only unknown variable is the moving direction (heading) as the θh. Since then,
the problem can be formulated as a regression problem to find the relationship of
the heading θh based on the current and past steering wheel angles. Intuitively, we
would think that the steering wheel controls the heading of the vehicle and it should
follow an equation as θh = f(θw). As a result, the key aim of this method is to use
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regression algorithm in finding the best fit function f and then applying the function
to reconstruct the vehicle trajectory. Figure 4.3 shows the regression results on the
heading versus the change of the steering wheel angle θw(tn)−θw(tn−1). The strict line
indicates the linear relationship between the steering angle changes and the heading.
The spots in the figure are the sampled data from the test drive. Using the derived
function f to calculate the heading of the vehicle from the known steering wheel
angles, we can construct the next coordinates when plugging into Equation 4.2. One
evident advantage of Method II is that it avoids the complex states and parameters
calculated in Method I. The exact model as to whether a front wheel is driven or
rear wheel driven is not necessary to be defined with Method II in reconstructing.
As a result, we could skip the approximated assumption in the mechanical model.
Besides, the result from the second method should be more accurate than Method I
as it is calculated on from real data which is not from the approximate formulation.
One of limitation of Method II is that as a regression process it would require lots
of data points for a training process to derive the exact function f , which might be
restricted on the edge device. As a result, we propose the training phase (regression
analysis) should be an off-line procedure, which is implemented on the other devices
and the final output, function f , is reported to the vehicle later.
4.4.3 Combined with Map Information
Not limited to the data collected by the sensors in the vehicle, the public
map data can also be used to locate the vehicle, which in terms validates the GPS
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Figure 4.3: Regression results on the heading versus steering wheel angle
signal. In this scenario, we consider the GPS validation is processed on the edge
part and the map information is considered as off-line data which would not add
extra communications on the edge. The third method makes use of the information
from the map to match the constructing coordinates acquired previously to a real
location along the road. In particular, we perform a comparison from the calculated
positions to the stored map positions. When the differences from those two positions
are small, we will assume this vehicle is on those routes. By continuously monitoring
several locations, we can infer the trip of the vehicle and compare the physical GPS
locations of the route with the received GPS signal.
In this experiment, we collect the road information from the Open Street Map
(OSM) which is a collaborative free editable map. The OSM contains the data
from GPS receivers, which makes it proper for assisting the GPS validation scheme.
Open Street Map uses a topological data structure, with four core elements listed
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as follows.
• Nodes are points with a geographic position, stored as coordinates (pairs
of a latitude and a longitude). A set of nodes are used to represent a way,
besides they are used to represent map features without a size, such as points
of interest or mountain peaks.
• Ways are ordered lists of nodes, representing a polyline, or possibly a polygon
if they form a closed loop. They are used both for representing linear features
such as streets and rivers, and areas, like forests, parks, parking areas, and
lakes.
• Relations are ordered lists of nodes, ways, and relations, where each member
can optionally have a “role”. Relations are used for representing the relation-
ship between existing nodes and ways. Examples include turn restrictions on
roads, routes that span several existing ways (for instance, a long-distance
motorway), and areas with holes.
• Tags are key-value pairs. They are used to store metadata about the map
objects (such as their type, their name, and their physical properties). Tags
are not free-standing but are always attached to an object: to a node, a way
or a relation.
After GPS signals are reconstructed by the previously proposed algorithms,
we use map information to locate the route. This is the following step to confirm the
GPS signal spoofing in order to take appropriate action. The procedure to extract
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Figure 4.4: OSM of College Park metro area, the selected area is 5.56 km (horizontal)
× 6.92 km (vertical)





















Figure 4.5: Extracted roads from OSM of College Park metro area, the total number
road extracted is 252
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the useful roads information and combine them to validate the GPS signal is listed
as follows,
1. In the first step, the map including all the data (e.g, the roads as well as the
other geographic features such as the parks, forests and lakes) in the nearest
area is downloaded from the cloud, as shown in Figure 4.4. The example map
shown represents an area of 5.56 km × 6.92 km.
2. Next, we extract the valid roads from the raw map data where the vehicles
could present. The extracted lanes are drawn as in Figure 4.5 and the other
useless regions or markers are removed from the map. After this filtering, the
remaining ways only consist of sets of nodes stored as a pair of latitude and
longitude g(lat, long). We will use these sets of GPS positions from the map
to validate the GPS constructed signals from the previous procedure. For the
example, there are in total 252 valid road segments are extracted from the
map area and drawn with different colors as shown in Figure 4.5. This step
can also be implemented off-line or parallel with the procedure as constructing
the GPS signals. Once we know a rough location of the vehicle from the range
of GPS, we could extract the roads information in advance.
3. The following step is to locate the vehicle on the extracted routes, the specific
calibration process is described in Algorithm 1. Based on the calculated GPS
signal from the former methods, we calibrate the exact GPS positions along
the route, which could lower the error rate and quickly detect any spoofing on
the GPS signal. The specific details are described as, first, we acquire a list
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of GPS signals as input g(g0, g1, · · · , gt). We iterate on this list, for each node
gi, we try to find the nearest routes along this node based on the threshold τ
as dist(gi, rj) ≤ τ . We collect those routes rj in the selected set as R. Keep
updating R, we will find the final route R which consists of a set of GPS
signals. Comparing the GPS location from the routes R as gr with the GPS
signal from the receiver ĝ, we can detect the spoofing if big differences exist.
Algorithm 1: Mapping calibration process
Input: (r0, r1 · · · , rk)← extracted roads and reconstructed GPS signals g(lat; long)
Output: a set of routes r
for a GPS signal gi from the set g(g0, g1, · · · , gn) do
for rj from the road set do
calculate the distance from gi to rj
end for
find the nearest route r∗ for the signal gi




4.5 Evaluation and Experimental Results
Have discussed the above methods that use driving information to cross-
validate the GPS signal and detect any spoofing attacks, we now design a series
of experiments to validate our initial hypothesis. First, we collect the driving infor-
mation as well as the GPS signals from real road tests. With the OpenXC module
assisted, we collect 15 driving trips from the same vehicle. The testing routes are
designed as 10-20 minutes long, and tried to cover all kinds of driving scenarios, in-
cluding left turn, right turn, driving around curved road and etc. With the OpenXC
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hardware demo plug into the vehicle, we collect the data from the OBD-II board and
record it on the cellphone App. Then, we construct the route based on the driving
information using the two methods we discussed above. At last, we need to estab-
lish whether the cross-validation method could detect the GPS spoofing attacks.
This can be accomplished by emulating an attack with misleading GPS signals with
respect to spoofing scenarios. To evaluate the applicability of our proposed GPS
detection method to real world vehicle data, we assess its performance in terms of
spoofing detection and detection time.
4.5.1 Driving Information Data Set
The driving data set we collected from the in-vehicle bus is extremely im-
portant to our proposed GPS spoofing detection methods. Here we will shortly
introduce the data acquirement methods and the type of data from the set. We ac-
quire the driving data by using the OpenXC platform which is a pluggable module
have hardware and software that lets the customer extend the vehicle’s applications.
It uses a standard and well-known tool to open up a wealth of data from the vehi-
cle to developers, even beyond OBD-II. OpenXC allows consumer devices, such as
smartphones, to access data from any vehicles. Using OpenXC, users can monitor
and read out data from many of the sensors on a vehicle, enabling new and inno-
vative vehicle-centric applications. The OpenXC provides a rich dataset including
the speed, steering positions, brake positions and the GPS signals from the sensor.
This plentiful dataset assists the GPS spoofing detection scheme proposed in our
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paper. Here, we mainly use the OpenXC vehicle interface, which is plugged into a
Ford 2017 vehicle through the OBD-II board to collect the in-vehicle information
needed. The signal format and specification used to construct the GPS signal are
listed in the below Table 4.1.
Name Range Frequency
steering wheel angle -600 to +600 degrees 10 Hz
vehicle speed 0 to 655 km/h 10 Hz
accelerator pedal position percentage 10 Hz
latitude -89.0 to 89.0 degrees 1 Hz
longitude -179.0 to 179.0 degrees 1 Hz
Table 4.1: OpenXC dataset
4.5.2 Model Validation
From the above discussions, the key parameters to model the driving behavior
of the vehicle should be determined before we reconstruct the GPS signal. As a
result, the first step is to validate the default parameter of the test vehicle based
on the driving data as well as the GPS signals without attacks for reference. For
Method I, we need to yield the steering ratio r from the training routes in advance.
Since lack of design details to calculate the ratio, we try to find the fitted steering
ratio for the test vehicle by sweeping mechanical reasonable range, i.e, from 11 to
20. Figure 4.6 displays an example of the constructed routes with a set of ratio
values and the corresponding true GPS signals (marked in a star) for reference. The
figure shows visually the third curve with r = 13 is the closest trajectory to the real
route. We further narrow down the range and verify the best-fit steering ratio of
the test vehicle is 12.4. We will use r = 12.4 in the following experiments on GPS
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spoofing detection.
Similar for Method II, the preliminary step is to model the relationship be-
tween the steering θw and the heading θh. We use the Matlab curve fitting toolbox
automatically find the best fit for the relationship. By trying different regression
methods (e.g, linear, polynomial and Fourier), we derive a linear relationship be-
tween the steering and the heading from 5000 single data points for training, as
shown in the Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.6: Reconstructed GPS Routes with different ratio, range of r is from 11 to
20 and the best fit is r = 13
4.5.3 Reconstruction of GPS Signals
We propose the implementation of two methods to reconstruct the GPS signal
from the in-vehicle dataset. The test performs a cross-check between the reported
GPS positions from the receiver and the estimated positions from our reconstruc-
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tion methods. While we have confirmed that the two methods could construct the
trajectory based on the driving information with an accepting error range, we now
focusing on constructing our detector. The most important factor of a well-defined
detector is the threshold for detection.
We check for each incoming position report whether dist(gi, ĝi) < τ holds,
where gi is the calculated GPS position and ĝi is the position reported by the receiver.
dist() is the Euclidean distance function, and τ denotes a predefined threshold
which tolerates measurement errors. Choosing the right threshold τ depends on the
accuracy of the underlying reconstruction method. Smaller τ lead to higher false
positive rates, while larger τ create more space for the spoofer.
More specifically, to make the signals consistent in formal representation, we
map the GPS signal from degrees to relative displacement by calculating the great-
circle distance from the latitude and longitude. Therefore, the coordinates of GPS
location can be expressed as Pg(xg, yg) in meter. Correspondingly, the reconstructed
location is expressed as Pr(xr, yr). Then, the errors can be defined as dist(Pr−Pg) =√
(xr − xg)2 + (yr − yg)2, which is represented in meter. We evaluate the error (m)
for route reconstruction by applying the two methods discussed above as shown in
Table 4.2. For all the test routes, the average error is 10.13m for Method I and
6.25m for Method II. By considering the route distance from the real road situation,
a thresh hold as small as 15m is appropriate to detect the spoofing attacks. Note
that the maximum error from Method I is above the threshold. To cope with the
false alert for Method I, we consider a sequence of 10 consecutive test points above
the threshold as a valid detection of spoofing. In addition, the average error of
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Method II is 6.25 m which achieves 38% decrease from the Method I. Therefore,
with lower error, Method II will achieve better performance in spoofing detection
and positioning.
Method 1 Method 2
Applications Max error Average error Max error Average error
route#1 18.03 10.49 13.90 6.95
route#2 19.01 10.67 13.28 6.75
route#3 19.02 10.71 11.73 5.90
route#4 18.68 9.54 12.91 5.58
average 18.57 10.13 12.92 6.25
Table 4.2: Statistical results from route reconstruction
4.5.4 Calibration with Map Information
With the two GPS reconstruction methods discussed above, we achieve the
best errors from Method II as 6.25 m. This accuracy is acceptable when the road
network is sparse in some rural areas. However, the result needs to be improved
when coming to the dense area in the city, where the distance between two roads
might be less than 5 meters. To improve GPS spoofing detection accuracy, we
identify an additional optimization technique that helps to lower the error rate. As
the open source maps contain GPS signals as fixed locations, this allows to better
predict the vehicle’s location by incorporating the discussed construction methods
with routes information extracted from maps.
Based on the former calculation, the maximum errors usually occurred when
the vehicle takes turns. This is because the steering signal changed frequently and
sharply when taking turns and the errors from the real signal are large when taking
use of our heading estimation method. As shown in the Figure 4.7 (a), the vehicle
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Figure 4.7: (a) Reconstructed GPS signal using Method II (b) Reconstructed GPS
signal with map information
is making right turns along the route, the reconstructed GPS signal aligns the route
well before the turn. However, the calculated path deviates from real GPS coordi-
nates and the mismatches accumulated with time. As clearly shown after the right
turn, a large margin is seen from the reconstructed positions to the real positions.
Since this margin will definitely influence accuracy as well as the threshold set for
spoofing detection, we consider making use of the map information to further cal-
ibrate the GPS signals. For example, we extracted the route information at that
intersection and figured out the vehicle is taking right turn based on several obser-
vations after the turn. As a result, the reconstructed GPS signal aligns the path
with the real signal, which is shown in Figure 4.7 (b). We conduct the same map
calibration on the training routes. Results also demonstrated that the errors drop
from 6-10 meters to 1.21 meters with the map information, which achieves 10 times
accuracy. With these achievements, the threshold for detection could be narrow
down and the false negatives for detection would decrease.
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4.5.5 GPS Spoofing Detection
With the definition of the valid detector discussed above, we now seek to
emulate a GPS spoofing attack and measure the effects. We compared our two
spoofing detection tests with regard to the detection rate and detection delay.
As we stated before, conducting legitimate GPS spoofing attacks in the wild
on the road test is challenging. We, therefore, use the simulated GPS spoofing
attacks to test the baseline of our expectations. The goal of these experiments is
to demonstrate that the vehicle could be misled form the route by emulated GPS
attacks consisted of wrong GPS signals. To simulate how real GPS spoofing attacks
impact the GPS signals on board, we designed several routes deviate from the real
location to simulate the GPS receiver is under spoofing. The speed of the fake
routes keeps the same as the one for the real route. The attacks would take place at
the intersections. For example, when the vehicle turns right, however, the designed
spoofing signals indicate it turning left.
From Table 4.3, we could find out that the detection accuracy for the simulated
spoofing attacks is 100%. And the response time of Method II is a bit faster than
Method I because it does not evaluate consecutive points to make a decision. Overall,
our results confirm that the faked GPS signal can be detected using construction
methods from in-vehicle measurements.
Applications Detection rate Detection time(s)
Method I 100% 18
Method II 100% 15
Table 4.3: Detection results from GPS spoofing
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4.6 Summary
GPS spoofing attacks threaten the confidentiality of the navigation and posi-
tion applications in vehicles. In this chapter, we propose a cross-validate a low-cost
method for detecting the spoofing of civilian GPS signals received by vehicles. Us-
ing driving information collected from the real routes, we demonstrate the ability to
detect such GPS spoofing attacks with high accuracy. We believe that our proposed
add-ons can easily be included in the future vehicles, and represents the best means
of reliability detect such attacks in the short and medium terms.
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Chapter 5: Blockchain-based Anonymous Reputation System for Trust
Management in VANETs
5.1 Introduction
Recently, VANETs are suggested as the foundation of intelligent transporta-
tion system to improve the efficiency of transportation and ensure the safety of both
vehicles and pedestrians. Two types of communications, namely vehicle-to-vehicle
and vehicles-to-infrastructure are established in VANETs to assist in sharing the
valuable driving information through the network [26]. Through dedicated short
range communication radio, vehicles exchange messages with nearby vehicles as
V2V and communicate directly with roadside units as V2I.
However, some unique characteristics of VANETs such as high mobility and
volatility [31] make it vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. Security, privacy, and
trust are becoming more and more critical when designing the VANETs. Although
some security services have been well-studied in other fields can provide secure
communication channels against external attackers, trust management and privacy
protection for vehicles are still open issues for VANETs. Specifically, it is difficult
to deal with mis-behaviors and forged messages from authenticated vehicles. These
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forged messages could not only decrease the transportation efficiency, but also cause
traffic accidents which threaten human life [45]. And in other case, internal attackers
can easily track other vehicles or profile the drivers’ actions by analyzing all the
broadcast messages in VANETs.
To mitigate those attacks from both internal and outside, a trust communi-
cation environment should be proposed to evaluate the trustworthiness of messages
based on both direct historical interactions and indirect opinions about the senders
[103]. An effective trust model should have the following properties:
1. Efficiency. It should determine the trustworthiness of a warning message in
both congestion and sparsity situations.
2. Privacy. It should not reveal any sensitive information about the senders
without permission, i.e, the identity of the senders.
3. Robustness. It should be resistant to those attacks aiming at deceiving the
trustworthiness evaluation or disabling the trust model.
Blockchain is the underlying technology of Bitcoin protocol emerged in 2008
[104]. It is a distributed and public ledger scheme encrypted with Merkel tree and
hash function. It reaches the consensus based on the proof of work (PoW) algorithm
[105]. These significant features of blockchain make it potential for constructing the
desirable trust model in VANETs. All the broadcast messages and actions of vehicles
will be written into the immutable and unforgeable record, which can be verified and
audited by every entity in the network later. However, the essential transparency
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of blockchain makes the privacy not protected. By checking the ledger, any actions
made with any public key are traceable.
In this chapter, we propose a blockchain-based anonymous reputation system
(BARS) to establish distributed trust management while simultaneously protect the
privacy of vehicles. First, we exploit the features of blockchain and extend conven-
tional public key infrastructure (PKI) with an efficient privacy-preserving authen-
tication mechanism. The linkability between the public key and the real identity
of a vehicle is eliminated when certificate authority (CA) operates the certificate
issuance and revocation. All the actions of CA are recorded in blockchain trans-
parently without sensitive information about vehicles so that the public key can be
used as an authenticated pseudonym. Law enforcement authority (LEA) is respon-
sible for managing BARS and keeping the pairs of public key and real identity in
case of dispute. Second, we design a reputation management algorithm to evaluate
the trustworthy of each vehicle from the authenticity of broadcast messages and
opinions from the other vehicles. Since all the messages are recorded in blockchain
as persistent evidence, it is easy for LEA to evaluate the reputation score for each
vehicle. The reputation score could provide incentive for internal vehicles to prevent
misbehaviors and mitigate the usage of forged messages.
5.2 Preliminaries
Before elaborating how BARS works, we will first introduce the concept of
blockchain and how it works to maintain the security. Then we investigate the
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problems of conventional PKI and explain the conception of certificate transparency.
5.2.1 Blockchain
Blockchain is a computational paradigm as the core component for the Bitcoin
[104]. It is a distributed ledger containing all transactions ever executed within the
network. The ledger is enforced with cryptography and carried out collectively in a
peer-to-peer system. As a secure and decentralized computational infrastructure, it
is widely acknowledged as a disruptive solution for the problems of centralization,
privacy and security when storing, tracking, monitoring, managing and sharing data
[106].
In blockchain, asymmetric cryptography is exploited to guarantee the security
of transactions through shared channels. The digital signature generated with the
sender’s private key provides authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. The
transactions can be accessed and verified by all the participant nodes in the network,
which is called mining. The participant nodes in the network are given incentives
in the form of Bitcoins for performing the mining operations. Miners compete to
solve a complex mathematical computation and the winner will earn Bitcoins as a
reward. Figure 5.1 presents the structure of a blockchain, each block contains the
hash value of the previous block, the timestamp, the nonce, and the root of a Merkle
tree. Miners compete to generate a new block by solving a complex mathematical
computation. A block is valid only if it contains PoW with a given difficulty. In the
PoW algorithm, miners should find a nounce so that the result is below a certain
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difficulty threshold. The time consumption for finding a new block can be controlled
by manipulating the difficulty. The block of successful PoW miner is selected to be
next block in the blockchain. Once a winner’s block is selected, all other nodes
update to that new block [107].
Figure 5.1: Structure of a blockchain, each block contains current and pervious
blockhash, nonce, timestamp and the Merkle root
Blockchain realizes a secure network with untrusted parties which is desirable
for VANETs with numerous nodes. PoW is a key component of Bitcoin, which
is difficult to solve, but trivial to verify. It often boils down to a random process
of trying to find a solution to a mathematical puzzle, like a partial hash collision
[108]. In VANETs, the RSUs with relatively high computing power can behave
as the miners. First, RSUs are responsible for verifying the messages to prevent
Sybil attack. Second, RSUs will collect those verified messages and record them
in blockchain. In this dissertation, we assume that attackers cannot control the
majority of the RSUs.
RSUs implement the PoW scheme by finding a nonce that gives the block’s
hash the required zero bits. Once the computing effort has been expended to make
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it satisfy the PoW, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work [104].
Whoever attempts to change one block has to redo all the blocks after it. If the
majority of computing power is controlled by normal RSUs, the honest chain will
grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an
attacker would have to redo the PoW of all blocks after it and surpass the work of
normal RSUs, which is not practical in VANETs with thousands of RSUs. Therefore,
all the broadcast messages in VANETs are tamper-proof and cannot be repudiated.
The lack of central control of blockchain ensures scalability and robustness by
using resources of all participating nodes and eliminating many-to-one traffic flows,
which in turn decreases delay and overcomes the problem of a single point of failure
[109]. The block header incorporates a Merkle root [110], which is the root of a hash
tree containing hash values of all messages in VANETS. It allows nodes to verify
that a message is part of a block by starting at the respective leaf and traversing the
branches up to the root [108]. If the final hash and the Merkle root are identical, the
message must be part of the block. For the verification, distributed nodes request
just a list of intermediary hashes instead of the whole block with all messages. Since
the block headers containing the Merkle root are secured, valid intermediate hashes
cannot be faked easily. Thus, the existence of a message can be efficiently and
reliably verified with this approach.
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5.2.2 Certificate Transparency
Certificate transparency [111] is invented by Google aiming to prevent trans-
port layer security (TLS) certificate authorities from issuing public key certificates
for a domain without being visible to the owner of the domain. The technology
is being built into Google Chrome aiming at website certificates. The core idea of
certificate transparency is that a public log is maintained to show all the certifi-
cates that have been issued [112]. The log is append-only. Anyone can append a
certificate to the log. Auditors can obtain two types of proofs: (a) a proof that
the log contains a given certificate, and (b) a proof that a snapshot of the log is an
extension of another snapshot (i.e., only appends have taken place between the two
snapshots).
Abstractly, a certificate is a signed pair (subj, pksubj), asserting that a subject
subj’s public key is pksubj . In certificate transparency, the CA’s database of certifi-
cates is maintained as a Merkle tree in which these pairs are stored left-to-right in
chronological order at the leaves of the tree. Items are added chronologically, by
extending the tree to the right. A certificate is accepted by a browser only if it is
accompanied by a proof that the subject’s key pair has been inserted into the log.
Observers can verify that the log is maintained append-only. To perform such a ver-
ification, the observer submits to the CA the hash value of the log at two different
times. The CA returns a proof that the log corresponding to the later hash value
is an extension of the log at the earlier time. The properties of Merkle trees ensure
the insertion into the log, and both proofs can be done in time/space O(logN).
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It is vital for the log to be a single linear record. If the log maintainer can
create different versions of the log to different users, the security is broken. Linearity
is guaranteed in two ways. First, whenever a user interacts with the log, it requests
proof that the current snapshot is an extension of the previously cached snapshot.
In order to avoid that a version constructed for a particular user is being used
before, it should be performed before authentication. Second, gossip protocols can
be used to disseminate values of the log, which means that the users of the log need
to find a method to exchange with other users the hash value of the log that they
have received. At any time, a user can request proof that the snapshot currently
offered by the log is an extension of a previous snapshot received through direct
communication with other users.
In certificate transparency, one can prove that a certificate is in the log, but
there is no proof of whether it is still current. Revocation transparency [113] is
an extension of certificate transparency aiming to deal with revocation. Two re-
lated methods for revocation transparency are proposed. The first method stores
revocations in a data structure called a sparse Merkle tree, which is a transformed
Merkle tree in which most of the leaves are zero. A 256 bit-length path in this tree
is used to represent the hash of a certificate. The path ends in a 1 or 0 accord-
ing to whether the certificate is revoked or not. Thus, the tree is a kind of binary
tree with 2256 leaves. However, because it is sparse, these leaves do not have to
be stored individually. To revoke a certificate, one alters the sparse Merkle tree
so that the relevant path terminates in 1, and one enters a record of this action
in the certificate-transparency append-only log. Unfortunately, checking whether a
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certificate has been revoked is inefficient. The second method is to track the revoca-
tions by a separate mechanism, which is related to the number of revocations that
in turn can be assumed proportional to the number of issued certificates. Alterna-
tively, one can check the entire certificate-transparency log for revocation records.
However, this is again linear in the number of issued certificates that proofs require
linear space and time with data sizes measured in tens or hundreds of gigabytes.
Therefore, this method is impractical.
5.3 Framework of BARS and Anonymous Authentication
Anonymous authentication is fundamental for trust communication and pri-
vacy protection. We first introduce the main components of BARS along with their
corresponding functions of anonymous authentication. In BARS, CA and LEA can
help in realizing the anonymous authentication by implementing three major tasks:
system initialization, certificate update, and public key revocation. We then re-
spectively present the three tasks and elaborate the process of privacy-preserving
authentication.
5.3.1 Components of BARS
Law Enforcement Authority (LEA). The functions of LEA include reg-
istration, monitoring behaviors of vehicles, and evaluating the reputation scores of
each vehicle. LEA authorizes CA for certificates issuance and revocation and keeps
the database that contains correlation between vehicles’ public keys and the real
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identities with high-level security.
Certificate Authority (CA). CA issues and revokes certificates only if it
gets the warrant from LEA. All the actions of CA will be recorded transparently in
the blockchain and can be verified by every entity in VANETs.
Certificate. The certificate contains the expiration date, the public key, and
the reputation score but no real identity so that privacy of the vehicle is protected.
Blockchain for certificates (CerBC). CerBC acts as the public ledgers
for all the issued certificates. It provides efficient proof of presence for received
certificates.
Blockchain for revoked public keys (RevBC). RevBC acts as the public
ledgers for all revoked public keys. It provides efficient proof of absence for the
senders public key.
Blockchain for messages (MesBC). All the broadcast messages will be
recorded in MesBC as persistent evidence in case of disputes.
Roadside Unit (RSU). The global consensus is based on the proof of work
(PoW) provided by RSUs. As long as more than half of the RSUs are not compro-
mised, the security of BARS can be guaranteed.
Vehicle. On one hand, vehicles can check the CA and LEA by verifying all
the messages recorded in blockchains. On the other hand, vehicles can also verify
each other to prevent misbehaviors and forged messages.
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5.3.2 System Initialization
At beginning, each entity generates a pair of private and public keys. When
vehicle A entering the network, it uses the secure channel to submit LEA its initial
public key and materials to prove its legal identity. LEA will send a signed warrant
to CA if the materials are valid. Next, CA will issue an initial certificate to vehicle
A.
Note that the submitted material contains the vehicle A’s private information.
Thus, only LEA preserves them in the database with high-security level, which will
be used for verifying the vehicle’s real identity when a dispute happens.
5.3.3 Certificate Update
Vehicle A will send a request to LEA for updating certificate in the following
situations: a) before the current certificate expires. b) if the security of its private
key is threatened. c) if it requests to replace its public key for privacy consideration.
The public key, reputation score, and expiry date are updated in a new certificate.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the steps to update certificate anonymously.
We also elaborate the detailed steps for certificate updating as following.
Step 1. Vehicle A generates a new pair of public key and private key {pknA, sknA}.
Step 2. Vehicle A sends LEA certificate update request encrypted with LEA’s
public key pkLEA. The request includes the vehicle A’s current public key pk
n−1
A ,
updated public key pknA, proofs of real identity, and the signature SigA generated
by A’s current private key skn−1A .
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Figure 5.2: Certificate update process. CA, LEA and vehicle involve in this process
Step 3. If vehicle A’s request is verified, LEA will send CA a signed war-
rant. For the purpose of privacy protection, the linkability between A’s current and
updated public keys is unknown by CA.
Step 4. CA will verify the signature in the warrant. Then, an updated
certificate containing the updated public key pknA, A’s reputation score RptA, and
the expiration time TA will be issued to vehicle A publicly and will be recorded into
CerBC. The message contains the following components.
CnA =
〈






In general, Vehicle A’s public key should be revoked before its expiry date or
A’s misbehavior is discovered by LEA. In order to provide revocation transparency,
LEA sends a signed revocation instruction to CA that contains the revoked public
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key pkrev and the revocation time Trev. Then CA broadcasts the revocation messages
that contains the revoked public key, the timestamp, signatures of CA and LEA:
Rev =
〈
pkCA, SigCA, pkLEA, SigLEA, pkrev, Trev
〉
.
The RSUs will verify all the revocation messages in a predefined interval, delete
the expired public key, and lexicographically insert revoked public keys into RevBC.
RevBC is constructed with a lexicographical Merkle tree [114] also called LexTree
that can provide efficient proof of absence. The idea is that we can group all the
information about a subject into a single node of the binary search tree, and while
being able to efficiently generate and verify the proof of absence. We consider an
order on bitstrings denoted ≤. This order could be the lexicographic order in the
ASCII representations but it could also be defined anything else. A LexTree LT is
a binary search tree of pairs of bitstrings:
• For two pairs (d, h) and (d′, h′) of bitstrings in LT , (d, h) is left of the occur-
rence of (d′, h′) if and only if d ≤ d′ lexicographically;
• For all nodes n ∈ LT , n is labeled with the pair (d,H(d, hl, hr)), where d
denotes the bistring and (dl, hl) (resp. (dr, hr)) is the label of its left child
(resp. right child) if it exists; otherwise it would be the constant null.
In this way, it prevents CA or LEA from arbitrarily revoking any public keys
because RevBC keeps the persistent evidence of all the revoking operations. Addi-
tionally, LexTree makes it very efficient for a vehicle to prove its public key is not




Vehicle A’s certificate CA is used for authentication. As shown in Figure 5.3,
when vehicle B receives CA, it first checks whether the certificate is expired. If not,
B will look up in the CerBC and RevBC to make sure CA is present in CerBC but
pkA is absent in RevBC, which means pkA is issued and not revoked by CA. Then we
will give the details of proof of presence and proof of absence in the authentication
process.
Figure 5.3: The process of anonymous authentication in the BARS
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5.3.5.1 Proof of Presence in CerBC
Figure 5.4 illustrates how to prove a certificate C4 is present in the CerBC.
A tuple (dir, hash) is used to prove the presence for C4 in the CerBC, in which
dir = left, left, right and hash = h3, h12, h58. The receiver can get the root hash
value using the tuple. If this root hash value is equal to the root recorded in CerBC,
it indicates that C4 and the associated public key is valid.
Figure 5.4: An example to show the proof of presence for a certificate
5.3.5.2 Proof of Absence in RevBC
It is unreasonable to force a vehicle to demonstrate that its public key is
revoked. Thus, a proof of absence is necessary for a vehicle to convince others its
public key is valid. As shown in Figure 5.5, all the revoked public keys (not expired)
are recorded in the data structure based on lexicographical Merkle tree. Vehicle A
should prove that two adjacent public keys (pk7, pk8) exist in the left-right traversal



























Figure 5.5: An example of proof of absence for a public key
A tuple (pk, hash) is used for proof of absence, in which pk = pk7, pk8, pk10, pk6
and hash = h9, h12, h4. Similarly, if the hash value calculated using the tuple is same
as h6 that is recorded in RevBC, it means that A’s public key is absent in RevBC.
5.4 Reputation Management
We present the BARS as a decentralized, efficient and robust trust model
in VANETs. BARS relies on the reputation score of a vehicle to determine the
trust level of broadcast messages. The reputation score is the incentives for vehicles
to share safety information and monitor each other so that misbehavior can be
prevented and the spread of forged messages from internal vehicles can be mitigated.
It is an essential issue but out of the scope of this dissertation to associate the
reputation score with a vehicle’s actual benefit.
BARS evaluates the reputation of a vehicle based on the authenticity of broad-
cast messages and opinions of other vehicles. The reputation evaluation mechanism
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consists of penalty and reward algorithms. Sharing authentic safety messages and
disclosing misbehavior or spread of forged messages will increase a vehicle’s rep-
utation score. Contrarily, some bad operations such as performing misbehavior,
broadcasting forged messages, and maliciously accusing other vehicles will decrease
its reputation score.
In this section, we will elaborate how BARS can provide a trust communication
environment meanwhile protect privacy of the vehicles.
5.4.1 Different Types of Messages
There are three types of messages involved in the VANETs communications:
beacon messages, alert messages, and disclosure messages. Periodically, vehicles
broadcast beacon messages containing driving status for traffic management. Alert
messages will be broadcast when an emergency happens such as hard braking or
losing of control. If any vehicles dispute the authenticity of the received message
or witnesses misbehavior, they can send disclosure messages to LEA. Next, LEA
will make a judgment on whether this will affect the reputation scores of related
vehicles. According to the critically of emergency, alert messages have three levels.
Level 1. When vehicle A loses control, it will broadcast level 1 alert message
to avoid potential collisions automatically.
Level 2. This level of alert message is used for forewarning nearby vehicles
before the sender changes its driving status, including braking, lane changing and
etc.
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Level 3. In case of poor road conditions such as obstruction or road damage,
passing vehicles will broadcast level 3 alert messages to alert vehicles behind to keep
caution.
5.4.2 Reputation Evaluation Algorithm
The reputation evaluation algorithm consists of two aspects: reward mecha-
nism and punishment mechanism. Based on our observations, there are two kinds
of behaviors of the VANETs will be rewarded. First, the vehicle broadcasts alter
messages honesty and actively. Second, the vehicle sends disclosure messages to
LEA when it witnesses misbehavior or receives forged messages. On the contrary,
there are also two actions will be punished. First, vehicle will get punished if it
is disclosed for misbehavior or broadcasting forged messages. Second, the vehicle
abuses disclosure messages to slander other vehicles.
There are several factors affecting the evaluation of reputation scores as follows.
For example, if an alert message is life-critical and is received by more vehicles, the
earlier one to report and broadcast is considered to given more contribution. Thus,
the more reward the sender will get in terms of reputation scores. We list the factors
would influence the reputation score as follows.
L: The level of alert messages, e.g., L = 1, 2, 3.
Dr: The relative density of vehicles which denotes as Dr = D/Daver. In this
chapter, Daver is set to 20 vehicles per km.
S: The sequence of the senders, S = 0, 1, ..., n. The first vehicle to broadcast
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alert message will be set to S = 0.
In addition, we set reward coefficient α and penalty coefficient β in formula
5.2 and 5.3 to implement reward mechanism and penalty mechanism.








As illustrated in Algorithm 2, if no receiver disputes the authenticity of an
alert message, the reputation score will increase base on reward mechanism. On
the contrary, if any receivers send disclosure messages to dispute the authenticity of
the alert message, LEA will collect evidence to make a judgment. The vehicles who
broadcast forged alert messages will be punished heavily. Whereas, the vehicles who
abuse disclosure messages will also get punished.
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Algorithm 2: Reputation Management Algorithm
Input: MA: Alert message broadcast by vehicle Vi(i = 1, 2...n); MD: Denounce-





of Vi and Vj; Si, Sj: The sequence in which messages are sent; Dr: The relative
traffic density at the location of the event.
Output: Ri, Rj: Updated reputation of Vi and Vj.
1: if j = 0 then
2: for each Vi do




i.honesty)· R(MA.type, Si, Dr)
4: Ri.cooperation← R
′
i.cooperation+ 100· R(MA.type, Si, Dr)
5: end for
6: else
7: if MA is true then
8: for each Vi do




i.honesty)· R(MA.type, Si, Dr)
10: Ri.cooperation← R
′
i.cooperation+ 100· R(MA.type, Si, Dr)
11: end for
12: for each Vj do
13: Rj.surveillance← R
′
j.surveillance+ 25·P(MA.type, Si, Dr)
14: end for
15: else
16: for each Vi do
17: Ri.honesty ← R
′
i.honesty · (1+ P(MA.type, Si, Dr) )
18: Ri.cooperation← R
′
i.cooperation · (1+ P(MA.type, Si, Dr) )
19: end for
20: for each Vj do
21: Rj.surveillance← R
′




25: return Ri, Rj
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5.5 Results and Analysis
5.5.1 Security Analysis
1. Security of Certificates. RSUs verify the signatures of CA and LEA in the
certificate issuance or revocation messages and record them into CerBC and
RevBC respectively. The global consensus is provided by the PoW of RSUs
to guarantee that each vehicle has the identical public ledgers that consist of
authenticated certificates and revoked public keys. As long as more than half
of all the RSUs are not compromised, the CerBC and RevBC are unforgeable
and immutable.
2. Security of Broadcast Messages. Proof of presence in CerBC and proof of
absence in RevBC ensure the authentication of the public key of vehicle A.
Then, vehicle A will use its private key skA to generate a signature for each
broadcast message and receivers can use A’s public key pkA to verify the sig-
nature. RSUs and vehicles cooperatively recorded all the broadcast messages
into the chronological MesBC, which is the persistent evidence when a dispute
happens.
3. Privacy of Vehicles: Vehicle A uses public key as the pseudonym to hide the
linkability between the public key and real identity. For the trade-off between
security and privacy, the database of identity-public key pairs is stored with
high-security level in LEA. It means only LEA knows the real identity of
the public keys so that LEA is able to track the malicious vehicle when it
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performs misbehavior or broadcasts forged messages. A vehicle can get several
certificates in one request and change its public key at particular locations to
enhance its privacy.
5.5.2 Validation of Reputation Evaluation
We consider three vehicles perform different behaviors in 100 hours. As Figure
5.6 presents, from T1 to T2 and T3 to T4, vehicle A and B actively broadcasts
authentic messages and their reputation scores increase correspondingly. From T2
to T3, vehicle B broadcasts five forged messages and is disclosed by A. Thus, A’s
reputation score increases whereas B gets punishment. From T4 to T5, vehicle B
abuses five disclosure messages to slander other vehicles. As a result, B’s reputation
score decreases. Vehicle C refuses to participate in the BARS. The results show that
the reputation score effectively reflects vehicles’ behaviors.




In BARS, receivers authenticate the public key of the sender based on proof
of presence in CerBC and proof of absence in RevBC. We first evaluate the perfor-
mance of anonymous authentication for vehicles in terms of storage and transmission
overhead and computational overhead. The implementation of anonymous authen-
tication is based on SHA-256. All the experiments are conducted using 2.5 GHz
Intel Core i5 and 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3. The time consumption to compute a
SHA-256 is less than t1 = 0.01 ms per 1 KB of input.
Storage and Transmission Overhead: A block header would take about 80 bytes
[104]. Suppose that blocks are generated every 10 minutes, the storage overhead for
one blockchain is 80 bytes× 6× 24× 365 = 4.2 MB per year.
An authentication packet for a public key consists of the associated certificate
(about 100 bytes), the tuple for proof of presence in CerBC, and the tuple for proof
of absence in RevBC. Suppose there are n issued certificates and m revoked public
keys, the total storage overhead of an authentication packet is S = 100 bytes +
32 bytes× log2n + (32 bytes + 8 bytes)× log2m. After authentication, only the valid
public keys (8 bytes for each) will be stored for the future communication.
As mentioned before, alert messages are broadcast only when an emergency
happens. The main source of transmission overhead is the authentication pack-
ets and beacon messages (about 100 bytes for each). Suppose that vehicle A re-
ceives i authentication packets per second from nearby vehicles, in which there are
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j new public keys. A will automatically discard the rest of authentication packets
if the public key is in the list of authenticated vehicles. Thus, the total trans-
mission overhead is Tran = 100 × (i − j) + S × j bytes per second. If we set
i = 100, j = i× 10%, n = 1, 000, 000,m = n× 10%, the total transmission overhead
is about 0.177M/s. The result shows that the storage and transmission overhead of
anonymous authentication is acceptable.
Computation Overhead: The proof of presence and proof of absence are based
on SHA-256 and can be done in time and space O(logn) (n is the number of ele-
ments in the Merkle tree). Theoretically, the time consumption to authenticate one
public key is T = t1 × (log2n + log2m). We assume that m = n × 10%,i.e. 10% of
the public keys are revoked. Figure 5.7 illustrates the time consumption of anony-
mous authentication in different scales of VANETs. The logarithmic-size proofs of
presence and absence provide efficient authentication in large scale network.
Figure 5.7: Time consumption of authentication. The time increases with the num-
ber of vehicles of the VANETs
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we address the issues of trust and privacy in VANETs. In order
to prevent the distribution of forged messages from authenticated vehicles meanwhile
protecting the identity privacy of vehicles, a blockchain-based anonymous reputation
system (BARS) is proposed for anonymous authentication and trust communication
for VANETs. Vehicles use two blockchains (CerBC and RevBC) for authentication,
which is based on proofs of presence and absence. Additionally, public keys act
as the pseudonyms for anonymous communication and the linkability between real
identity and the public key is broken to protect vehicles’ privacy. On the other
hand, all the broadcast messages are recorded in MesBC as persistent evidence to
evaluate each vehicle’s reputation. A reputation management algorithm is designed
for trust communication to prevent the spread of forged messages and incent vehi-
cles to expose misbehavior. Finally, we analyze the security and validity of BARS
and evaluate the performance. The results show that BARS effectively improve
the trustworthiness of broadcast messages and protect vehicle privacy with high
efficiency.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we proposed solutions to deal with the emerging security
concerns on vehicles. Specifically, we started from the in-vehicle network bus com-
munications and proposed two IDSs correspondingly to protect the in-vehicle CAN
bus by hardware-dependent techniques. Those two IDSs combined could discover
both content changes on the messages identifiers and the physical voltage changes
observed on the bus.
Then we have investigated a commercial key agreement system for CAN bus
and proposed physical side-channel attacks to break this key sharing protocol ef-
ficiently. Meanwhile, we have demonstrated that the in-vehicle information could
be applied to detect spoofing on the GPS signal which is critical to the localization
system of VANETs. At last, we have established a trust management mechanism
among vehicles while protecting the privacy meantime which could be realized by
blockchain techniques. The details in conclusion for each aspect are summarized as
follows.
• We first developed a novel IDS scheme relied on checking the entropy changes
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of the CAN ID, which can be used to alert the CAN bus system when under
attacks. We implemented the proposed IDS and validated its effectiveness on
real bus data collected from a Ford Fusions internal CAN network through
the OBD-II port. Our approach does not require modification on the message
contents or frame structures. Thus, it is applicable to any implementation
of CAN protocols, including CAN-FD. Besides, our proposed IDS does not
require much computation overhead which could be implemented on the ECU.
• We then proposed an idea to fingerprint the ECUs on bus for solving those im-
personate attacks. Our proposed scheme overcomes the blind spots of content-
based IDS by monitoring the physical layer and is feasible to be deployed on
a CAN network by adding minimal hardware to the existing CAN bus. We
have demonstrated our proposed idea on CAN-bus prototype built on Arduino
micro-controllers.
• We have demonstrated that several physical features including voltages, timing
and so on can be used to probe the PnS-CAN scheme. We identify the funda-
mental characteristics that lead to such attacks and propose countermeasures
to minimize the information leakage at the hardware level.
• We have demonstrated that a low-cost method to validate the GPS signal on
the edge using the in-vehicle dataset. Specifically, we proposed two methods
(i.e., the Kinematic model and Regression model) respectively to reconstruct
the GPS signal from the driving maneuvers and we also take use of the off-line
map information to further calibrate the GPS signals.
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• We addressed the issue of trust and privacy in VANETs by proposing the
BARS: A Blockchain-based Anonymous Reputation System. Two blockchains,
CerBC and RevBC, make the activities of authority transparent for all enti-
ties in the VANETs. The blockchain implemented proof of presence and proof
of absence provide anonymous authentication with high efficiency. Moreover,
BARS also provided an effective reputation evaluation algorithm as an incen-
tive for the vehicles participating in the trust management system.
6.2 Future Work
We also envision the implications and possible future directions of this disser-
tation work.
6.2.1 Security of CAN
6.2.1.1 Futher Discussions on Attacks and Countermeasures
The goal of the security discussion in this dissertation on CAN bus is twofold.
Firstly, it demonstrates that even simple physical features can be utilized to compro-
mise the CAN bus system, i.e., the PnS-CAN scheme. Secondly, it illustrates that
detection techniques can be applied by monitoring the changes to protect the CAN
bus from attacks. We emphasize that neither of these investigations is intended to
represent the comprehensive attack vectors or defense mechanisms.
For example, given the robustness of the CAN protocol, one can imagine that
there are a series of fundamental component variations that can be utilized to add
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noise to the characteristics extracted which may influence the detection rate of the
IDS. However, future results in classification and learning theory can improve the
performance of the detection method beyond what has been discussed. As a result,
several open questions remain with the IDS discussed above. Further, improved de-
tection countermeasures can be developed by digging and combining more physical
features. While we have studied certain empirical dependencies, a comprehensive
analysis can yield better insight into the identification of dominant physical char-
acteristics. For our attacks and countermeasures, we utilized a simple laboratory
set-up to emulate the CAN system. A real deployment of the system is subject to
far more noisy conditions and many subtle electrical effects, e.g. transmission line
phenomenon, that is not accurate in our setup.
Moreover, there are fundamental trade-offs that can be investigated between
the IDS and the efficiency of the communications on the bus. For example, the
addition of monitors or IDS for detection, while maintaining featured samples be-
tween the farthest nodes may require the operation of the system at a lower speed.
However, this will decrease the bus efficiency also increase the observability of the
adversary.
6.2.1.2 Immigration from CAN to Ethernet
Except for the security discussion around CAN bus, there is an aroused debate
to replace the CAN network by the Ethernet, which has higher bandwidth, more
flexible and already has security protocols (i.e., the MAC code) [20]. The motiva-
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tion for this replacement is first intrigued by the communication and bandwidth
requirements increase as more and more new and complex applications appear in
the car for the use-cases as autonomous driving and entertainments. However, not
only for the bandwidth consideration, existing vehicle control networks like the LIN,
CAN and FlexRay standards are not designed to cover these increasing demands
in terms of security. However, it is non-trivial to push the transfer as future net-
working technology should re-use as much as possible from the previous deployment
while taking into account the automotive-specific requirements [115]. This includes
hardware components as well as software stacks updated, which require huge efforts.
Specifically, in-vehicle networking architecture appears as a heterogeneous system
as a result of its historically grown nature. The usage of Ethernet in the car means
a paradigm shift in the design of next-generation in-vehicle networking systems:
connecting different domain networks, transporting different kinds of data (control
data, streaming, etc.) and fulfilling the stringent robustness demands in terms of
extended temperature range and EMC performance. It is necessary to decrease the
heterogeneity of today’s in-vehicle communication systems, that consist of several
CAN, FlexRay or MOST busses connected via gateways, by aggregating several
systems into one Ethernet-based communication network [116].
Come back to our proposed IDS schemes for the in-vehicle network, it is curious
to find out the transferable property of them from the CAN to the Ethernet. For
the content-based IDS by checking the 11-bit identifier, which takes use of the
unique characteristics of the CAN bus arbitration, it is not directly applicable on
the Ethernet. However, the general idea about the content-based IDS may also be
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applied with the Ethernet frame, but need to investigate the details of the Ethernet
format. For the physical-based IDS, no matter what kind of protocols are used for
the in-vehicle network, the physical probability would always exist and could be
utilized. Thus, the applicability of physical IDS could immigrate to the Ethernet
protocol as well. The only concerns left for this open question is the method to
analyze the physical feature extracted may need modification due to a different
arbitration protocol.
6.2.2 Cross-check Validation among Sensor Data
Various kinds of sensors are installed on the modern vehicle to guarantee the
functionality and automation, as vehicles heavily rely on their sensor readings. At-
tackers can compromise one or more of the in-vehicle network sensors by changing
the sensor readings to confuse the driver. Hence, anomalous sensor readings caused
by either malicious cyber-attacks or faulty malfunction of sensors can result in dis-
ruptive consequences, and possibly lead to fatal crashes. Redundancy can be used
to address the compromised sensors but adding extra sensors will increase the cost
per vehicle and is therefore less attractive.
To balance the need for security and cost-efficiency, the natural redundancy in
the sensor readings could be used to tackle the attacks on the sensor. By definition,
natural redundancy occurs when the same physical phenomenon causes symptoms in
multiple sensors. For instance, pressing the accelerator pedal will cause the engine to
pump faster and increase the speed of the vehicle simultaneously. Engine revolutions
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per minute (RPM) and vehicle speed are multiple sensors which respond in a related
fashion to the same cause of the accelerator pedal. The challenge is identifying
the relationship between similar but different sensors under normal operation and
detecting anomalous behavior accurately. It is similar to the cross-check method
we proposed for detecting the GPS spoofing. We begin with the observation that
sensors within the vehicle are naturally correlated.
As stated before, falsified sensor values have a significant impact on the safety
and security of the vehicle as it can confuse the driver, and even cause the vehicle to
misbehave. Several gaps are apparent in the literature. First, most of the detection
method focuses on the pairwise correlation of two signals [117], while ignoring the
other facts from the other signals as well. Some correlations between variables
are evident as the fundamental similarity. For example, vehicle speed from the
inertial measurement unit (IMU) sensor and from the GPS sensor are identical speed
calculation. It is almost the same as using redundant sensors [118]. However, a lack
of studying the other correlated values may give the chance for colluding sensor
attacks. Second, most of the validation work focuses on the correlation at a specific
time, without taking into the previous sensor value for consideration. The previous
value might also correlate to the present value. To correlate the lag window data
with the current value could also provide more evidence when detecting the anomaly.
Last, to the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of deep learning implementations
in anomaly detection and identification for multiple variants. Data are becoming
more readily available and deep learning models are renowned for their performance
using large datasets.
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Here, we present a similar cross-check system as the GPS spoofing detection
which targets on cross-checking the readings of sensors. In our approach, we pro-
posed to use regression models to integrate correlations from multiple sensors and
estimate a targeted sensor value using other correlated parameters in real time. The
difference between the estimated value and observed value of this sensor data is used
as a signal for detecting anomalies. First, we use a VAR model as a regression learn-
ing approach which estimates certain parameters by using correlated/redundant
data. The estimated values are compared to observe ones to identify abnormal con-
texts that would indicate an intrusion. Then we try to use a deep learning technique
called long short-term memory network (LSTM) to detect and identify anomalous
behaviors of sensors in the vehicle. In this approach, a deep recurrent network model
is trained to integrate correlations from multiple sensors with a time window and
estimate a targeted sensor value later for anomaly detection. The integration of
multiple heterogeneous sensors increases the attacker’s difficulty of bypassing this
detection scheme, while making the detection more stable under different scenarios.
In addition, the major components (e.g., anomaly detection module) are embedded
in edge computing devices, which make the anomaly detection be more efficient and
privacy-preserving.
In order to detect anomalies, it is first necessary to estimate a targeted sen-
sor value using other correlated parameters. It can be formulated as a prediction
problem and modeled using regression models in machine learning. In the training
phase, a set of correlated signals values are used to train a regression model M .
Given a trained regression model M and a set of time-series parameters at time t,
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expressed as V (t) = v1(t), v2(t), · · · vn(t) (e.g., v1 = speed, v2 = acceleration, v3 =
engine speed) extracted from the CAN bus messages. After learning the relationship
among the multi-variable, we can predict the upcoming variable V (tm)
′ at time tm.
For the n variables, we select the targeted value for forecast as vi(tm)
′ which is being
estimated (e.g, speed). Meantime, the real measurement from the sensor is recorded
as vi(tm). Then anomalies can be flagged by comparing vi(tm)
′ with observed vi(tm).
We propose to perform correlation modeling among continuous time-series
variables from Table 6.1. The variables are divided into two classes sensors within
the vehicle which are broadcast on the CAN bus, and sensors from an external
GPS system. Correlating both internal and external sensors gives us additional
redundancy and robustness of the system. In order to successfully fool the system,
the attacker has to compromise both internal and external systems, thus increasing
the difficulty for a successful attack.
Name Range Frequency
steering wheel angle -600 to +600 degrees 10 Hz
torque at transmission -500 to 1500 Nm 10 Hz
engine speed 0 to 16382 RPM 10 Hz
vehicle speed 0 to 655 km/h 10 Hz
accelerator pedal position percentage 10 Hz
odometer 0 to 16777214.000 km 10 Hz
fuel consumed since restart 0 - 4294967295.0 L 10 Hz
latitude -89.0 to 89.0 degrees 1 Hz
longitude -179.0 to 179.0 degrees 1 Hz
Table 6.1: Time-series dataset
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6.2.3 Efficient Blockchain System for Trust Management
For the trust management, we proposed in this dissertation, all the certifi-
cates and transactions are requiared to be recorded permanently and immutably on
the blockchain to make the activities of the authorities transparent and verifiable.
However, the experimental results show that to implement the anonymous authen-
tication it inevitably adds the storage and transmission overhead for the VANETs.
Therefore, it remains a challenge on how to use such blockchain effectively for au-
thentication in real driving scenarios (e.g., high speed or a large number of messages
during congestion) [119].
Another problem of the existing BARS system is the privacy-preserving suffers
from several drawbacks. First, the activities of TA are not transparent to all the
vehicles. TA may arbitrarily authorize some vehicles to join in the VANETs without
being monitored. Second, the receivers need to query a Certificate Revocation prior
to the message authentication to check whether the sender’s public key has been
revoked or not. With the rapid increase in the number of vehicles, this certificate
updates requires a large amount of storage space and such query incurs high compu-
tation overhead. Those unsolved problems push the updates of the blockchain-based
privacy-preserving authentication scheme to integrate the semi-trusted authorities
with the emerging blockchain technology using carefully designed data structures.
A novel data structure named the Merkle Patricia Tree (MPT) might be a future
direction as it extends the conventional blockchain structure to provide a distributed
authentication scheme without the revocation list. Meanwhile IBM’s Hyperledger
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Fabric (HLF) platform v1.1, which is a permissioned blockchain that securely tracks
the execution history in an append-only replicated data structure without build-in
cryptocurrency is a good candidate to implement the trust system on VANETs.
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Laganá, Max Mauro Santos, and Zonghua Gu. Analytical and experimental
performance evaluations of can-fd bus. IEEE Access, 6:21287–21295, 2018.
[25] Muhammad Alam, Joaquim Ferreira, and José Fonseca. Introduction to in-
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[63] Michael Müter and Naim Asaj. Entropy-based anomaly detection for in-vehicle
networks. In Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV), 2011 IEEE, pages 1110–
1115. IEEE, 2011.
[64] Hyun Min Song, Ha Rang Kim, and Huy Kang Kim. Intrusion detection
system based on the analysis of time intervals of can messages for in-vehicle
network. In Information Networking (ICOIN), 2016 International Conference
on, pages 63–68. IEEE, 2016.
[65] Michael R Moore, Robert A Bridges, Frank L Combs, Michael S Starr, and
Stacy J Prowell. Modeling inter-signal arrival times for accurate detection of
can bus signal injection attacks: a data-driven approach to in-vehicle intru-
sion detection. In Proceedings of the 12th Annual Conference on Cyber and
Information Security Research, page 11. ACM, 2017.
[66] Mirco Marchetti and Dario Stabili. Anomaly detection of can bus messages
through analysis of id sequences. In 2017 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium
(IV), pages 1577–1583. IEEE, 2017.
166
[67] Min-Joo Kang and Je-Won Kang. Intrusion detection system using deep neural
network for in-vehicle network security. PloS one, 11(6):e0155781, 2016.
[68] Kyong-Tak Cho and Kang G Shin. Fingerprinting electronic control units for
vehicle intrusion detection. In USENIX Security Symposium, pages 911–927,
2016.
[69] Kyong-Tak Cho and Kang G Shin. Viden: Attacker identification on in-vehicle
networks. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pages 1109–1123. ACM, 2017.
[70] Wonsuk Choi, Kyungho Joo, Hyo Jin Jo, Moon Chan Park, and Dong Hoon
Lee. Voltageids: Low-level communication characteristics for automotive in-
trusion detection system. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, 13(8):2114–2129, 2018.
[71] Tobias Hoppe, Stefan Kiltz, and Jana Dittmann. Security threats to au-
tomotive can networks–practical examples and selected short-term counter-
measures. In International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and
Security, pages 235–248. Springer, 2008.
[72] Blesson Varghese, Nan Wang, Sakil Barbhuiya, Peter Kilpatrick, and Dim-
itrios S Nikolopoulos. Challenges and opportunities in edge computing. In
2016 IEEE International Conference on Smart Cloud (SmartCloud), pages
20–26. IEEE, 2016.
[73] Benjamin Glas, Jorge Guajardo, Hamit Hacioglu, Markus Ihle, Karsten Wehe-
fritz, and Attila Yavuz. Signal-based automotive communication security and
its interplay with safety requirements. In Proceedings of Embedded Security in
Cars Conference. Citeseer, 2012.
[74] David Brown, Geoffrey Cooper, Ian Gilvarry, Anand Rajan, Alan Tatourian,
Ramnath Venugopalan, David Wheeler, and Meiyuan Zhao. Automotive se-
curity best practices. White Paper, pages 1–17, 2015.
[75] Norbert Bißmeyer. Security in ecu production. ETAS White Paper, 2016.
[76] Andreas Mueller and Timo Lothspeich. Plug and secure communication for
can. CAN Newsletter, pages 10–14, 2015.
[77] Shalabh Jain and Jorge Guajardo. Physical layer group key agreement for
automotive controller area networks. In International Conference on Crypto-
graphic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 85–105. Springer, 2016.
[78] Qian Wang, An Wang, Liji Wu, and Jiliang Zhang. A new zero value at-
tack combined fault sensitivity analysis on masked aes. Microprocessors and
Microsystems, 45:355–362, 2016.
167
[79] Qian Wang, An Wang, Gang Qu, and Guoshuang Zhang. New methods of
template attack based on fault sensitivity analysis. IEEE transactions on
multi-scale computing systems, 3(2):113–123, 2017.
[80] Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E Hinton. Imagenet classifica-
tion with deep convolutional neural networks. In Advances in neural informa-
tion processing systems, pages 1097–1105, 2012.
[81] Pal-Stefan Murvay and Bogdan Groza. Source identification using signal char-
acteristics in controller area networks. IEEE Signal Processing Letters, 21(4):
395–399, 2014.
[82] Roar Elias Georgsen. Machine learning based intrusion detection in controller
area networks. B.S. thesis, 2016.
[83] Mark L Psiaki and Todd E Humphreys. Gnss spoofing and detection. Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE, 104(6):1258–1270, 2016.
[84] Brady W O’Hanlon, Mark L Psiaki, Jahshan A Bhatti, Daniel P Shepard,
and Todd E Humphreys. Real-time gps spoofing detection via correlation of
encrypted signals. Navigation, 60(4):267–278, 2013.
[85] Mark L Psiaki, Brady W O’Hanlon, Jahshan A Bhatti, Daniel P Shepard,
and Todd E Humphreys. Civilian gps spoofing detection based on dualreceiver
correlation of military signals. In Radionavigation Laboratory Conference Pro-
ceedings, 2011.
[86] Md Tanvir Arafin, Dhananjay Anand, and Gang Qu. A low-cost gps spoofing
detector design for internet of things (iot) applications. In Proceedings of the
on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2017, pages 161–166. ACM, 2017.
[87] Jung-Hoon Lee, Keum-Cheol Kwon, Dae-Sung An, and Duk-Sun Shim. Gps
spoofing detection using accelerometers and performance analysis with proba-
bility of detection. International Journal of Control, Automation and Systems,
13(4):951–959, 2015.
[88] Siam U Hussain and Farinaz Koushanfar. Privacy preserving localization for
smart automotive systems. In Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2016
53nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2016.
[89] Nathaniel Carson, Scott M Martin, Joshua Starling, and David M Bevly. Gps
spoofing detection and mitigation using cooperative adaptive cruise control
system. In Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV), 2016 IEEE, pages 1091–1096.
IEEE, 2016.
[90] Qian Wang, Zhaojun Lu, Mingze Gao, and Gang Qu. Edge computing based
gps spoofing detection methods. In 2018 IEEE 23rd International Conference
on Digital Signal Processing (DSP), pages 1–5. IEEE, 2018.
168
[91] Kai Jansen, Matthias Schäfer, Daniel Moser, Vincent Lenders, Christina
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